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Cocoa production in Papua New Guinea (PNG) is a major industry involving 
over 150,000 families in the coastal and island regions of the country.  
According to the 2000 National Population Census cocoa producing households 
represent 31% of households in the cocoa producing regions and 16% of the 
total number of PNG households.  Most households producing cocoa are also 
dependent on subsistence agriculture for their livelihoods.  In recent decades 
dependence on cash has increased markedly due to rising material aspirations 
and economic development.  Higher standards of living are being sought as 
lifestyle values change and cash is increasingly required to meet the costs of 
education, health and other goods and services (Lummani, 2003).  Cash has 
also become an indispensable item in many non-market exchange transactions 
such as brideprices, mortuary and compensation payments and other social 
obligations determined by kinship.  Hence, the cash income earned by 
smallholder cocoa producers contributes significantly to meeting the material 
needs and social obligations of households and communities.  
 
This monograph presents the results of a three-year study of smallholder cocoa 
production on the Gazelle Peninsula in East New Britain (ENB) Province, 
PNG.  ENB Province, and the Gazelle Peninsula in particular, is a major 
producer of cocoa.  Between 1994/5 and 2002/3 approximately 54% of national 
smallholder cocoa production was from ENB (Cocoa Board of Papua New 
Guinea data).  Yet, despite its dominance in national production and high 
smallholder productivity relative to other cocoa growing provinces, smallholder 
yields in ENB are well below potential levels.   
 
The monograph arises from a long-held concern among industry stakeholders 
about the relatively low productivity and incomes of cocoa smallholders.  A 
long-term sustained research program in cocoa breeding and pests and diseases 
together with the presence of a cocoa extension program have had only minimal 
impact on improving smallholder yields and incomes, due in part to the low 
uptake of new technologies and extension advice.  The purpose of this book is 
to document the main socio-economic factors constraining smallholder 
production and productivity and to use this information to design research and 
extension services to raise smallholder productivity and incomes.  We argue 




livelihood strategies of smallholders, there are opportunities for considerable 
increases in smallholder productivity without the need to expand the area of 
land under cultivation.  The latter option of increasing the area of cocoa 
cultivation is no longer viable for PNG given high population growth rates and 
limited availability of land for further expansion of cocoa.   
 
To investigate the constraints on smallholder cocoa productivity the research 
approach placed an emphasis on understanding the social and cultural context 
of smallholder cocoa production, particularly intra-household decision-making.  
This is important in the PNG context where smallholder producers depend 
largely on family labour for harvesting and farm maintenance tasks.  Focusing 
on the organisation and management of household labour enabled a fuller 
picture of the range of socio-economic factors influencing cocoa production to 
emerge.  Further, such an approach recognises that smallholder production is 
embedded in broader social and cultural systems that influence the decisions 
made by smallholders.  This approach moves away from the more conventional 
technical and top-down research approaches commonly used to examine 
smallholder productivity issues in the developing world.  Understanding the 
socio-cultural context in which smallholder practices and decisions are made 
enables sustainable solutions to be found that address the low productivity and 
incomes of smallholders in a way that accommodates their life world and 
priorities.  As Vanclay notes in relation to agricultural extension more generally 
(2004, p.213): 
 
Agriculture has too long been thought of as a technical issue 
involving the application of science, and the transference of the 
outputs of that science via a top-down process of technology 
transfer. It is not. Agriculture is farming, and farming is people. 
The survival of agriculture is dependent on the survival of viable 
rural communities. Sustainability has multiple bottom line 
implications, containing environmental, social and economic 
dimensions. The criteria and indicators for sustainability in a 
physical sense are generally understood. The economic 
indicators are also well established, although rather limited. 
What is lacking is an awareness of the social issues.  
 
The emphasis on the household and the socio-cultural context of production in 
this study sits within a broader research framework that draws on the 
Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) (Chambers & Conway, 1992; Ellis, 




livelihoods.  Although the SLA was originally developed as a tool in 
development planning to assist in poverty alleviation, the approach has much to 
offer smallholder research and planning.  For example, the SLA serves to 
identify the constraints and opportunities that shape peoples’ livelihood options.  
It also encourages a broader perspective to investigate and think about the 
diverse livelihood strategies in which most smallholders are engaged.  Some 
earlier research approaches tended to view smallholder commodity production 
in isolation of other household livelihood strategies that influence production 
strategies.  For instance, cocoa producers were commonly perceived as solely 
cocoa producers, and the diverse range of other livelihood practices were 
ignored.  By livelihood strategies we refer to the “range and combination of 
activities and choices that people make/undertake in order to achieve their 
livelihood goals” (DFID, 1994, p.33): these goals being household wellbeing, 
economic security and social stability.  Cocoa production is but one of a range 
of livelihood strategies in which smallholder cocoa households are engaged. 
 
Key features of the SLA is its recognition of the heterogeneity within rural 
communities, the diversity of economic and agricultural strategies among and 
within rural households, and the role of access to resources and assets in 
creating and sustaining people’s livelihoods.   
 
Several features of the SLA make it a suitable framework for analysing 
smallholder cocoa production.  These include: 
∑ placing people and households at the centre of the research, thereby 
encouraging a participatory approach; 
∑ recognising that people pursue diverse livelihood strategies (commodity 
production is just one of a broad range of livelihood strategies); 
∑ seeking to understand the factors enhancing or constraining people’s 
choice of livelihood strategies (social and cultural variables in addition 
to economic variables are important for this understanding); 
∑ seeking to understand the constraints on particular livelihood 
opportunities (e.g., inability to access credit);  
∑ acknowledging the multiple influences on people’s livelihood strategies 
(e.g., influence of national and local government policies, market access 
and social and cultural factors); and, 
∑ taking a multi-method approach to researching the factors influencing 
people’s livelihood choices and activities. 
 
This broader approach to investigating smallholder production enables a more 




to develop, which in turn increases the probability that the recommendations 
emerging from the research will reflect the needs and priorities of smallholders 
and, therefore, be more successful than previous top-down initiatives to raise 
smallholder productivity.   
 
Three decades of smallholder research on the Gazelle Peninsula point to a set of 
persistent problems that have been known by the industry for a long time.  
These constraints are described in Chapter 3 and include labour shortages, low 
levels of block maintenance, land shortages and low cocoa prices.  Despite 
awareness of and attempts to overcome these constraints there have been no 
lasting solutions to low productivity and incomes of growers.  The present 
study has sought to investigate and explain the social and economic factors 
underlying these on-going problems, rather than to simply document their 
continued presence.  To this end Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 examine: 
∑ land tenure; 
∑ household labour and cocoa production strategies; and, 
∑ farm management practices (in particular pest and disease management 
practices). 
 
Chapter 8 investigates the interrelationships amongst the main factors affecting 
productivity and incorporates them in a Model of Smallholder Production.  The 
Model reveals that the age of a cocoa stand is a key determinant of block 
condition including its vegetation structure, degree of shading and level of 
infestations with pests and diseases.  The typical smallholder cocoa block 
receives little or no pruning and shade control, and there is virturally no 
management of pests and diseases.  Poor accessibility also leads to a significant 
amount of under-harvesting on older cocoa blocks thereby adding to the 
reservoir of disease inoculant.  Thus, the age of a cocoa stand determines block 
condition which in turn influences labour inputs through the adoption of 
particular production strategies by households.   
 
The Model of Smallholder Production described in Chapter 8 identifies three 
development stages of the cocoa block — immature, mature and senile — each 
with its own distinctive set of vegetational structural characteristics, pest and 
disease levels, degree of accessibility for harvesting, quantity of accessible 
healthy, ripe crop available for harvesting, and smallholder production strategy.  
There are two broad production strategies followed by smallholders: the low 
labour input foraging strategy in which cocoa is harvested and sold as wet bean; 
and the higher labour input farming strategy usually associated with dry bean 




especially for pruning and shade control, cocoa blocks typically enter the very 
low productivity foraging phase prematurely at around 7 or 8 years of age.  
With the exception of Bougainville, where there recently has been a large-scale 
replanting program following the civil war, most cocoa blocks in PNG are more 
than eight years old and are therefore locked into a foraging production strategy 
in which recurrent income is insufficient to finance replanting.  Blocks under a 
foraging strategy have fewer ripe healthy pods for harvesting, creating further 
disincentives for smallholders to invest time and labour in harvesting and block 
maintenance.   
 
More importantly, the Model provides a conceptual framework for 
understanding smallholder production strategies that can be used for developing 
policy initiatives to address some of these long-standing problems.  Potential 
new policy directions are described in Chapter 9.  These include initiatives 
which involve the commercial sector working in partnership with smallholders 
for the delivery of extension services to growers.  It is argued that the 
commercial sector should take more responsibility for the delivery of extension 
and other services to growers. 
 
The rest of this chapter provides an overview of the cocoa industry in PNG.  
The discussion focuses on plantation and smallholder production and some of 
the key trends and industry policies affecting smallholder production.  This 
provides the context for the detailed household-level analyses that follows in 
later chapters. 
 
The arrival of cocoa in Papua New Guinea 
German traders introduced cocoa to PNG around 1900.  Development of the 
industry was slow in the early years, and by 1940 annual exports had reached 
only 200 tonnes (PNG Export Tree Crop Study, 1987).  The Australian colonial 
administration promoted the rapid expansion of the industry in the 1950s by 
encouraging smallholders to plant cocoa.  National production grew rapidly 
from the 1950s to the mid-1970s, and despite the participation of smallholders 
in the industry, most of this growth was from the plantation sector which 
dominated cocoa production until 1977 (PNG Export Tree Crop Study, 1987).  
Plantation production fell rapidly thereafter following independence due mainly 
to the neglect of plantations during an extended period of low prices and an 
escalation in land tenure disputes, while smallholder production continued to 





The cocoa industry contributes to the PNG national economy largely by 
providing employment and income for rural households, and by generating 
foreign exchange.  In addition, there is substantial indirect employment in the 
service and processing industries.  In the mid-1980s the cocoa plantation sector 
directly employed an estimated 8,000 people (PNG Export Tree Crop Study, 
1987).  In coastal regions of the country 31% of households are involved in 
cocoa production (National Statistical Office, 2001).   
 
There is scarce information on annual household income from cocoa.  In a 2001 
study in East New Britain Province, the average annual income per farm 
household from cocoa was K2,867 (in 2001 K1=A$0.55), made up of dry bean 
sales of K2,803 and wet bean sales of K64 (Omuru et al., 2001). Lummani 
(2006) estimated average annual household cocoa incomes in the Buin District 
of Bougainville to be K716, made up of dry bean sales of K447 and wet bean 
sales of K269. 
 
Export revenue from cocoa bean exports fluctuated greatly in the period from 
1981 to 2004 in response to changing prices.  Between 1981 and 1990 cocoa 
was second to coffee as the main export crop in PNG, with average annual 
export earnings of K47 million.  From 1991 to 2000 export earnings from cocoa 
grew to an average of K60 million per annum, and from 2001 to 2004 increased 
to K205.63 million per annum.  Annual export earnings for cocoa reached their 
highest level in 2003 at K258 million, which amounted to 19% of the total 
export earnings from agricultural products.  PNG’s total cocoa export revenue 
for 2005 was K199 million, representing 17% of the total share of export 
revenue from the major export tree crops (Bank of Papua New Guinea, 2006).  
While the total value of cocoa exports has increased, cocoa has dropped to third 
rank in its overall significance to the PNG agricultural economy, after oil palm 
and coffee1 (Bank of Papua New Guinea, 2006).  
 
Despite relatively better prices in the second half of the 1990s, annual 
production has stagnated between 30,000 and 40,000 tonnes thus limiting any 
major growth in export earnings from increases in volume (average annual 
production is 36,000 tonnes).  In 2005, cocoa export volume was 44,200 tonnes 
compared with 36,500 tonnes in 2001 (Bank of Papua New Guinea, 2006). 
 
 Trends in the PNG Cocoa Industry 
The review of market and industry trends for cocoa in this section is in five 
parts: prices; production and productivity; production costs; exports; and 





Domestic Cocoa Prices 
Figure 1.1 shows domestic cocoa exports (free-on-board) (FOB), delivered-in-
store (DIS) prices in nominal terms and the level of government levy/bounty 
over this period.  Prices rose steadily in the mid-1970s and reached a peak in 
1978/79 before declining and remaining stagnant for much of the 1980s and 
early 1990s.  Prices then rose rapidly to peak in 1998 at over K3,000 per tonne 
before dropping to around K2,000 per tonne in 2000.  Prices rallied strongly in 
2001 and 2002, reaching their highest levels in 2002 and have remained 
relatively high in recent years.  In 2006, FOB cocoa prices averaged K4,624 per 
tonne and DIS prices K4,049 per tonne.  Relatively high prices over recent 
years are mainly a consequence of the political uncertainties in the Ivory Coast, 
the world’s largest cocoa producer. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. PNG cocoa prices and levies/bounties (1974-2005) (source: Cocoa 
Board Statistics).  
 
In general, domestic prices increased significantly from 1994 primarily as a 
result of the devaluation of the Kina in September 1994 and the floating of the 
Kina since October the same year, as part of an International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) stabilisation programme.  Further depreciation of the Kina against the US 












dollar and other major currencies resulted in price increases until 1998/1999 
when prices began to decline due to lower international prices.  
 
In addition, prices received by producers from the mid-1980s to 1994 were 
subsidised, firstly by bounty payments from the cocoa stabilisation funds (mid-
1980s to 1989) and secondly from loans provided by the government to each 
commodity industry (cocoa, copra, coffee and oil palm).  The loans were 
introduced in December 1992 as part of an agricultural price guarantee scheme 
for a five-year period (1992-1997)2 when the stabilisation funds were exhausted 
in 1989/90. 
 
Cocoa Production and Productivity 
Cocoa in PNG is produced by plantation companies and village smallholders.  
Plantation production stagnated between 8,000 and 15,000 tonnes from 1977/78 
to 1987/88, then increased sharply in 1988/89 (Figure 1.2).  It has been 
declining since then. Some factors contributing to this decline include the 
(Omuru, 2003): 
∑ collapse of production from Bougainville which was producing about 
36% of the total plantation cocoa output prior to civil unrest in 1988/89;  
∑ lack of additional land for expansion; and  
∑ increasing costs of production.  
 
Smallholder cocoa production, in contrast, grew from 6,800 tonnes in 1972/73 
to 29,500 tonnes in 1988/89.  Production fluctuated between 15,000 and 30,000 
tonnes between 1991/92 and 2000/01 but recovered strongly from 2001/02, 
reaching an all time high of 39,082 tonnes in 2002/03.  Since then, smallholder 
production has fluctuated reaching a peak of 40,141 tonnes in 2004/05 (Figure 






Figure 1.2. Cocoa bean production by sector in PNG from 1970 to 2005/06 
(source: Cocoa Board Statistics). 
 
Trends in Production Costs 
Cocoa plantation costs of production are summarised in Table 1.1.  Average 
costs of production in real terms for cocoa plantations fluctuated from 1995 to 
1998 with a slight decline over the period. The average cocoa plantation 
production cost from 1995 to 1998 was K1,870 per tonne in nominal terms and 
K2,150 per tonne in real terms (1998 Kina values).  
 
Table 1.1. Average costs of production per tonne 1995-1998. 
Cocoa costs of 
production 
1995a 1996b 1997c 1998c 4-year 
average 
































A 2001 survey of 44 cocoa plantations provides the most recent estimate of 
costs of production (Table 1.2).  The highest cost component was 
overhead/fixed costs, which were 55.3% of total costs, followed in declining 
order of share of total costs by “mature upkeep/field variable costs”, 
“processing and despatch costs” and “harvesting costs” (Table 1.2).   
 
Table 1.2. Average cocoa plantation costs of production in PNG, 2001. 
Major cost category Kina per 
tonne 
% Kina per 
hectare 
% 
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11.7   
Total cost of production  (a 






Source: Omuru, 2003. 
* For comparative purposes, the production costs for 1998 are shown in brackets. 
 
Cocoa plantation costs of production increased by 90% from 1998 to 2001.  
This is partly attributable to the 34.6% fall in plantation cocoa yield over the 
same period.  Moreover, all major cost categories registered increases ranging 
from K49 per tonne (17%) for harvesting to K1,219 per tonne (173%) for 
overhead/fixed costs.  Processing and mature upkeep had cost increases of 
K160 per tonne (65%) and K222 per tonne (38%), respectively.  However, on a 
cost per hectare basis, mature upkeep and harvesting costs actually had 
decreases of 6% and 20%, respectively mainly because of the large drop in 
yields over this period.  The increase in overhead costs was 86%.  
 
For the smallholder sector, the average costs of production per tonne and 
profitability for smallholders in ENB in 1999 are summarised in Table 1.3. 
The average total cost of production for the cocoa sample in 1999 was K447.48 
per tonne.  A major cost to smallholder producers was transporting the cocoa to 
exporters in Kokopo/Rabaul: K182.66 per tonne, or 41% of total production 
costs.  The second most important cost category was processing, which 
accounts for K101.91 per tonne (23%).  Remaining costs were shared between 




Table 1.3. Average cocoa costs of production and margins for ENB 
smallholders in 1999. 
Cost category Cocoa 
(Kina per tonne) 
% of total cost 
of production 
Field variable cost 78.10 17.4 
Harvesting 84.81 19.0 
Processing 101.91 22.8 
Transport 182.66 40.8 
Total cost of production (a) 447.48 100 
Estimated producer price (b) 2,162a  
Net margin (income) [(b)-(a)] 1,715  
Source: Omuru, 2003. a Average delivered-in-store price (Cocoa Board 2000). 
 
Cocoa Exports 
All cocoa produced in PNG is exported as dried bean.  Until the 1991/92 cocoa 
year, over 90% of dry bean was exported to Western Europe and North 
America, with Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands 
and the United States of America (USA) being major buyers.  Since then, 
Singapore has become a major buyer of PNG cocoa and together with the USA 
accounts for about half of PNG’s total cocoa exports (Cocoa Board of PNG, 
2005). 
 
Government and Industry Policies 
Government intervention in the cocoa industry has been mostly in price 
stabilisation and/or direct price support.  Various forms of price stabilisation 
schemes have been implemented since independence in 1975.  Price 
stabilisation schemes have aimed to give producers a stable income and a 
guaranteed minimum price to provide producers with incentives to maintain 
production during low commodity price cycles.  Price stabilisation policies 
assumed that a minimum producer price would ensure that smallholders would 
receive a return at least on par with the minimum rural wage and that of 
plantations.  This assumption formed the basis of a stabilisation levy and 
bounty schedules.  Levies were collected from producers and accumulated in a 
Cocoa Stabilisation Fund (CSF) when the price exceeded a certain floor price or 
the cost of production.  Bounties were paid to producers when the market price 
fell below the guaranteed floor price to offset the difference between the 
prevailing market price and the floor price. 
 
Until May 1980, cocoa prices were above the set threshold level and levies 
were collected.  At the time the CSF, including interest generated, reached a 




threshold level, resulting in bounties being paid out from the CSF to stabilise 
producer prices (Figure 1.1).  Prices remained low or fluctuated for most of the 
1980s, and draw-downs continued until the CSF was fully depleted in May 
1989 (Omuru, 1996). To maintain producers’ welfare and sustain production, 
the Cocoa Board obtained a government guaranteed loan to pay bounties to 
farmers.  However, the Board was unable to make timely repayment and the 
resulting outstanding loan of K26 million was written off by the National 
Government in December 2006.  
 
Apart from the various forms of price stabilisation schemes, there have been no 
overall major policy changes to date, although efforts to review policy issues 
were addressed at a National Cocoa Summit of cocoa industry stakeholders 
held in July 2003 at Vunapope in the ENB Province.  The purpose of the 
summit was to allow industry stakeholders to highlight the major challenges 
facing the industry and to address priority areas, including the need to review 
the Cocoa Board Act.  Nothing to this effect has yet eventuated.  Presently the 
most immediate challenge to the cocoa industry is the incursion in 2006 of the 
Cocoa Pod Borer Conopomorpha cramerella into the country.  This pest has the 
potential to cause losses of 80-90% to the cocoa crop in PNG if not correctly 
managed and controlled. 
 
The next chapter describes the methods adopted in this study to investigate 







In the Field 
 
This chapter describes the research methods employed in the study.  The 
research approach relied on quantitative and qualitative methods, particularly 
qualitative methods associated with participatory action research (see Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2000; Chambers, 2002).  By applying participatory approaches to 
smallholder research, with a focus at the household level, we aimed to make 
recommendations for improving smallholder productivity and incomes that 
supported existing livelihood strategies, reflected the needs and priorities of 
smallholders and hence had a higher probability of being successful.  Further, 
the farmer-oriented approach of the research, whereby considerable time was 
spent with farmers and their families and agricultural extension officers were 
involved in the research design and data collection, encouraged a more ‘bottom-
up’ methodology that facilitated an understanding of the socio-cultural context 
of smallholder cocoa production.   
 
The research commenced with a review of the smallholder literature in ENB.  
This was followed by a half-day workshop in July 2003 with cocoa extension 
officers employed by the Cocoa and Coconut Extension Agency (CCEA)1.  The 
workshop sought to identify the main constraints on smallholder production as 
seen by the extension officers.  The following broad topics were discussed: 
∑ socio-economic characteristics of high and low cocoa producers and 
their families; 
∑ agronomic and farm management practices of high and low cocoa 
producers and their families; 
∑ factors influencing the supply of family and hired labour for cash crop 
production; 
∑ influence of customary and social/religious factors on cash crop 
production; 
∑ influence of land access and land tenure on cash crop production; 
∑ effects of prices on smallholder productivity; 
∑ role of market access on production; and, 






Based on the results of the workshop a list of key factors affecting production 
was compiled to guide smallholder interviews and quantitative surveys (Table 
2.1). 
 
Table 2.1. Factors identified by extension officers as affecting smallholder 
production on the Gazelle Peninsula. 
 
Agronomic and Farm 
Management Practices 
 
Levels of block maintenance. 
Harvesting rates. 
Disease management. 





Household labour supply (demographic characteristics). 
Access to household labour (constraining factors). 
Household labour strategies in cocoa production. 
 
 
Household Cocoa Holdings 
 
Type of planting material. 
Type of land tenure. 
Methods of regulating family members’ individual 
access to cocoa holdings. 






 Adequate and secure land holdings. 
 Labour from the extended family. 
 Hired labour. 
 Fermentary and dryer. 




Household Social Relations 
 
Levels of household conflict/stability. 






Range of livelihood options including off-farm 
employment and migration. 
Degree of economic pressure to harvest cocoa (e.g., 
school fees). 
Importance of cocoa to the household economy. 






As evident in Table 2.1, the household has been emphasised as the unit of 
analysis, with attention paid to the range of economic and social activities that 
households pursue in addition to cocoa production.  This has been done to place 
commodity production in the broader context of household livelihood 
strategies. Although household-level analysis has been highlighted, 
consideration has also been given to external factors, such as the role of 
extension, market access, cocoa prices and marketing as these affect household 
decision-making.   
 
 Study Sites 
Data were collected from villages in two LLG areas in the northeast of the 
Gazelle Peninsula (Fig 2.1). 
1. Malakuna No. 4, Ulautava and Tinganavudu villages in the Kokopo-
Vunamami LLG area;  
2. Vunalaiting Village in the Livuan-Reimbar LLG area. 
 
Malakuna No. 4, Ulautava and Tinganavudu villages all have good road access, 
are close to markets at Kokopo, and have been producing cocoa and copra since 
the early 1970s.  Cocoa is cultivated under a mix of land tenure regimes 
including customary land tenure, ‘purchase’ and ‘reserve’ land (for further 
discussion see Chapter 4).  The population of the council ward areas of 
Malakuna No. 4, Ulautava and Tinganavudu is 2,569 (National Statistical 
Office, 2001). 
 
At Vunalaiting Village, the hamlets of Tabaule and Bulupa were selected 
because unlike the Kokopo-Vunamami LLG villages, these hamlets do not have 
copra and rely primarily on cocoa for income.  Also, land at Tabaule and 
Bulupa is under freehold title, gained when the land and title which was 
previously under plantation2 and registered as State ‘reserve’ land was 
transferred to the landholding clan leader and subsequently subdivided amongst 
clan members.  The majority of smallholders allocated blocks at Tabaule and 
Bulupa were from Vunalaiting and Vunapaka villages.  Villagers refer to this 
subdivided land where they have settled and planted cocoa as ‘reserve land’.  
As ‘reserve land’, villagers claim the land is not subject to the same matrilineal 
inheritance rules as customary land and therefore is free from matrilineal claims 
from the wider clan group (see Chapter 4 for further discussion of ‘reserve’ 
land).  The ‘reserve’ land tenure regime of Tabaule and Bulupa hamlets enables 
comparisons to be made with the Kokopo-Vunamami LLG villages where 
37.2% of the cocoa is planted on customary land.  Also, because Tabaule and 
Bulupa are close to the Cocoa Coconut Institute (CCI) (approximately 5 km 
away) the hamlets provide an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of CCI 
research and extension, especially since Tabaule and Bulupa have only recently 
planted cocoa in the last ten to fifteen years.  In the 2000 National Census, the 



































The study area of the Gazelle Peninsula has a rainfall of approximately 2,000 
mm per annum along the Blanche Bay coast, rising to 2,700 mm in the western 
area near the Keravat River, with the drier months between May and October 
(Ghodake et al., 1995).  The seasonal cocoa flush periods differ between the 
two LLG study areas.  In the Kokopo-Vunamami LLG villages the main cocoa 
flush is from April to June/July, with a ‘mini’ flush in November-December.  
Moving to the north-west of the survey area to the Livuan-Reimbar LLG area, 
villagers identify a main cocoa flush period running from September/October to 
December/January, with a ‘mini’ flush in May/June to July.   
 
 Data Collection 
Data collection in Kokopo-Vunamami LLG and Livuan-Reimbar LLG villages 
was in three parts: 
∑ Weekly interviews and surveys of fourteen smallholder households.   
∑ Socio-economic survey of 93 cocoa smallholder households.  
∑ Cocoa farm management assessment (including an assessment of pest 
and disease levels) of 100 smallholder cocoa blocks in the Livuan-
Reimbar LLG.  
 
Weekly Household Interviews 
Weekly household interviews form the bulk of the data underpinning this study.  
For this report a household is defined as all those members of the family and 
extended family residing together in the same or nearby houses, and sharing 
household resources.  Typically, meals are shared between household members 
even though members may live in adjacent houses.   
 
Weekly interviews were undertaken during three phases.  The first phase was 
for a four-week period in October-November, 2003.  A second phase ran for 
four weeks in May 2004.  In addition a small number of interviews were 
undertaken between May and November, 2004 by the research assistants during 
brief monitoring visits to the field sites. A third and final round of interviews 
was conducted among Vunalaiting Council Ward villages in December 2004 
and January 2005 over a five week period.   
 
The second and third phases of the weekly surveys were timed to coincide with 
the main cocoa flush periods of the two LLG areas.  During the 2004 survey 
period, however, the May to July flush was reduced substantially because of 
unusually wet conditions in the lead up to the flush period which affected 
flower and fruit formation (see also Post Courier, 19 August, 2004).  Many 




infestation rates of Phytophthora infected pods (Black Pod) in their blocks.  It is 
likely that for some growers, especially dry bean sellers, cocoa incomes for the 
2004 flush period were significantly lower than usual for this period.  Similarly, 
in the 2004 October/November to December/January flush in the Livuan-
Reimbar LLG area, villagers commented that the flush began well, but pod 
development declined slightly after a few weeks.  Thus, the intention to capture 
seasonal variations in household cocoa production, economic activities and 
labour allocation was only partly met.   
 
Households were selected on a range of characteristics including demographic 
profile of household, size of cocoa holdings and whether the household was 
predominantly selling wet or dry cocoa beans.  The sample size for the weekly 
repeat interviews was small because of the lengthy time required to collect 
detailed qualitative data to develop household case studies.   
 
During the weekly surveys, each family was interviewed on the same day each 
week.  Each interview took between one and two hours to complete, allowing 
for three families to be interviewed per day.  By having sample households 
spatially clustered in two main areas, travel times between interview locations 
were reduced. This is especially important when household members may be 
absent on a particular interview day (e.g., visiting relatives, hospital, business in 
town).  Further, a spatial clustering of sample households allows the influence 
of village-level factors affecting cocoa production to be determined, such as 
village-wide preparations for church, school or ceremonial activities which may 
reduce or enhance the supply of labour for cocoa production. 
 
Each week a standardised survey instrument was administered which recorded 
for the previous seven days (the period between interviews):  
∑ Quantity of cocoa/copra sold. 
∑ Income earned from cocoa. 
∑ Income from other sources (e.g., wage labour, copra, vanilla and sales of 
items at local markets and remittances from town-based relatives). 
∑ Household and non-household labour contributions to cocoa or copra 
production. 
∑ Cocoa block maintenance activities (labour contributions and type of 
work).  
∑ Household contributions to communal activities like council or church 





The purpose of these surveys was to develop household case studies that 
determined the importance of cocoa in terms of labour and income, as well as 
revealing how households organised and mobilised labour for cocoa production 
and other livelihood activities.   
 
An informal interview typically followed the standardised survey instrument 
and expanded on points raised in the formal interview (e.g., labour constraints, 
theft of cocoa pods or vanilla beans and plants, transport difficulties, and cocoa 
disease problems).  Interviews explored decision-making concerning the 
allocation of household labour and income, broader factors influencing 
household and family members’ participation in cocoa production, and other 
household and village activities.  Informal interviews were ‘free-flowing’ and 
gave smallholders an opportunity to raise points which they saw as important in 
cocoa production or in other aspects of their lives more generally.  On most 
occasions the survey and interview format involved interviewing husband and 
wife separately.  This was especially important when one partner, usually the 
wife, had a tendency to take a ‘back seat’ during interviews.  By ensuring 
women were included in the interviews, the study captured the important role of 
women in cocoa production and their views on commodity production and 
broader household and community issues.   
 
In phases one and two, an extension officer was usually present at the weekly 
interviews.  This served two purposes. First, it involved extension officers 
directly in the research and helped them to develop an appreciation of the 
broader socio-economic factors influencing smallholder cocoa production.  
Secondly, when required, they provided advice regarding particular problems 
affecting smallholders’ blocks (e.g., methods of pest control).  Discussions with 
the extension officers when travelling between interviews also helped the 
research team develop a fuller understanding of each smallholder family and 
their circumstances.  Often extension officers picked up important details that 
would have gone unnoticed by other research team members.  For instance, the 
extension officers often made an informal block inspection of the interviewee’s 
cocoa holdings while the rest of the team was engaged in interviews.  These 
inspections enabled a rapid assessment of the condition of the block and the 









The smallholder sample (n=93) for the socio-economic survey was drawn from 
the same villages selected for the weekly surveys. The survey was carried out in 
November-December, 2003.  Data were collected on the following: 
∑ Planting details (cocoa variety, area and year planted, type of shade, 
land tenure arrangements). 
∑ Cocoa harvested in preceding seven days (amount harvested, income 
earned, costs of production). 
∑ Household demographic characteristics. 
∑ Farm and non-farm income sources. 
∑ Farmer training and extension received. 
∑ Ownership of farm tools. 
 
Households were randomly selected from the two LLG villages and the surveys 
were carried out by CCI research staff and four second-year Vudal University 
students.  The students participated in a training workshop which outlined the 
purpose of the survey and explained interviewing techniques.  The 
questionnaire was piloted by the students among eight growers prior to the main 
survey being administered.  The pilot survey resulted in some minor changes to 
the survey instrument and gave students an opportunity to practice and refine 
their interviewing techniques.  Throughout the survey students were closely 
supervised by CCI research staff and/or extension officers. 
 
 Cocoa Farm Management Assessments 
In November and December, 2004, an assessment of smallholder cocoa farm 
management was conducted on 100 smallholder cocoa holdings belonging to 
randomly selected cocoa farmers in the Livuan-Reimbar LLG.  The assessment 
coincided with the flush period in the north-west of the Gazelle Peninsula.  For 
each cocoa holding, the farm management assessment recorded: 
∑ Terrain and size of holding. 
∑ Main varieties of cocoa present and year planted. 
∑ Shade trees present. 
∑ Numbers of un-harvested dry pods. 
∑ Numbers of healthy pods. 
∑ Numbers and types of diseased pods. 
∑ Presence of Canker, Vascular Streak Disease, Pink Disease, Longicorn 
and Webworm (Panseptor). 
∑ Weed and shade control standards. 





For the count of cocoa trees affected by disease and the number of un-harvested 
pods, 10 cocoa trees per block were surveyed (in total 1,000 trees).  On each 
tree, counts were made of the number of: Phytophthora infected pods (Black 
Pod); dry pods (cocoa pods that were not harvested when ripe); and, healthy full 
size pods.  The first tree surveyed on each block was on the road-side edge of 
the block and then every fifth tree, moving into the centre of the block was 
surveyed.  Pest and disease assessment was supervised by a staff member of 
CCI’s pathology section, with assistance from a senior extension officer.  Data 
collection was undertaken by research staff within CCI’s economics section and 
three Vudal University students on work experience with the project. 
 
Industry Interviews 
Industry stakeholder interviews included the following people:   
∑ Members of the Board of Directors of the Bailu Plantation landowner 
group at Malakuna No. 4, Ulautava and Tinganavudu villages. 
∑ CCI extension officers and senior managers. 
∑ Commercial sector representatives (including plantation managers and 
cocoa exporters). 
∑ Rural Development Bank personnel. 
∑ Executive Director of the Cocoa Growers Association. 
∑ Provincial government representatives from Division of Primary 
Industry (DPI), Lands Division and Planning Division.   
 
In many of the meetings and interviews with industry stakeholders the research 
team discussed ideas for the design and implementation of alternative models of 
extension and marketing for cocoa production.  The interviews also provided 
information about new and proposed industry policies and interventions, the 
current state of the industry and the broader national and provincial policy and 
institutional context of smallholder production.  The interviews were very 
informative and revealed some of the constraints on smallholder production, 
especially those factors external to the household such as price, government 
policies, transport, extension services, credit facilities and general industry 










Smallholder Cocoa Production in East New Britain 
 
Cocoa production plays a primary role in the rural economy of ENB and is the 
main income source for many rural households (Yarbro & Noble, 1989; 
Ghodake et al., 1995; Omuru et al., 2001).  Over the last decade smallholder 
cocoa production in ENB has been variable (Figure 3.1), but has increased its 
share of total production relative to plantation production (Figure 3.2).  From 
1994/95 to 2002/03 total annual smallholder production averaged 13,130 tonnes 
compared with total plantation average annual production of 3,644 tonnes 
(Cocoa Board of PNG data).  Further, between 1994/95 and 2002/03 
approximately 54% of national cocoa production by smallholders was from 
ENB (Cocoa Board of Papua New Guinea data).  More recently, production of 
cocoa in Bougainville has rebounded with the end of civil conflict and 
Bougainville is likely to overtake ENB as the largest provincial producer in 
PNG in the near future.  
 
The dominance of ENB, and in particular the Gazelle Peninsula, in national 
production is partly an historical legacy of intensive post-Second World War 
government efforts to establish indigenous cocoa production in the province.  In 
the 1950s and 1960s, several projects such as the large agricultural land 
settlement schemes at Vudal and Warangoi, the Tolai Cocoa Project and the 
founding of the Lowlands Agricultural and Experiment Station (LAES) at 
Keravat facilitated the uptake of cocoa as a smallholder commodity crop.   
 
Recent data on household average annual cocoa incomes for ENB are limited. 
Omuru et al. (2001) estimated average annual cocoa income per household of 
K2,867, made up of dry bean sales of K2,803 and K64 for wet bean sales.  
Their study estimated an annual income of K2,371 for dry bean sellers and 
K408 for wet bean sellers.  Later, Omuru (2005) noted in ENB that gross 
margins for cocoa smallholders selling dry bean were 69.4% higher than for 
those selling wet bean. 
 
Like cocoa growers in other provinces in PNG, most ENB growers sell their 
cocoa as wet bean (Yarbro & Noble, 1989; Ghodake et al., 1995).  That most 
ENB cocoa growers are wet bean sellers indicates that overall cocoa income 
and returns to labour are relatively low.  The low economic return from the sale 
of wet bean has implications for levels of farm investment, farm management 
practices including household labour strategies, the use of hired labour and the 
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Despite large fluctuations in smallholder output (Figure 3.2), yields per hectare 
have been rising since the late 1980s (Table 3.1) due to the introduction of high 
yielding and more disease-resistant hybrid cocoa varieties.  New cocoa hybrid 
planting materials, SG1 and SG2, were released in 1982 and 1986 respectively, 
and these were followed by SG2 Modified hybrid planting materials (Big and 
Small) in 1994 and two polyclonal hybrid cocoa clones in 2003 (Yinil et al., 
2006).   
 
Based on 1999 data, Omuru (2001) reported smallholder yields of 620 kg/ha, a 
substantial increase on previous yield estimates in ENB, most of which were in 
the range 250 kg/ha to 400 kg/ha (Table 3.1).  The improved yields recorded by 
Omuru (2001) were explained by: a) more favourable climatic conditions 
leading up to the survey; b) the large number of high yielding hybrid cocoa 
trees planted after the 1994 volcanic eruption in Rabaul coming into production 
at that time; and c) high cocoa prices which motivated smallholders to harvest 
their cocoa blocks.   
 
Table 3.1. Smallholder yields for ENB from 1968-1999. 











1989 (Yarbro & Noble) 
1989 (Nicholls) 
1989 (Nicholls) 
1994 (George)   
1998 (Omuru et al. 2001) 
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Variability in smallholder productivity in ENB has received little attention in 
the literature.  Omuru et al. (2001) and Yarbro & Noble (1989) reported a weak 
positive relationship between cocoa yields and area planted.  Yarbro & Noble 
(1989) found reported higher yields were associated with larger planted areas, 
whilst Omuru et al. (2001) found that although the highest yields were recorded 
amongst the largest farm size group (>6 ha), the second highest yields were 





Studies of smallholder yields in ENB have consistently reported yields below 
those of the plantation sector.  Further, despite the recently reported increase in 
smallholder yields in ENB, yields remain well below the potential levels of the 
higher yielding SG2 cocoa hybrids released to smallholders.  Yet, the 
productivity of ENB smallholders is higher than that of cocoa smallholders in 
other provinces (Nicholls, 1989), which may be explained by their greater 
uptake rate of hybrid cocoa varieties because of their proximity to the cocoa 
breeding centre and nursery at the national Cocoa Coconut Institute at Tavilo.  
 
 Smallholder Studies in ENB 
Although the number and scope of studies investigating the constraints on 
smallholder cocoa productivity on the Gazelle Peninsula and elsewhere in PNG 
is limited, several common factors have been identified to explain low 
productivity.  These include: 
∑ Labour shortages. 
∑ Low levels of block maintenance (and high rates of pests and diseases). 
∑ Land shortages. 
∑ Low cocoa prices. 
 
Each is discussed briefly. 
 
 Labour Shortages 
Most smallholder households rely on unpaid family labour for cocoa production 
(Yarbro & Noble, 1989; Omuru & Fleming, 2001).  Despite the large size of 
ENB families, labour shortages are a major constraint on cocoa output 
(Ghodake et al., 1995; Lummani & Nailina, 2001).  According to Lummani & 
Nailina (2001), labour shortages result from:  
∑ Lack of cooperation amongst household members in cocoa production. 
∑ Illness or death of family members (disruptions to work schedules 
during mourning periods). 
∑ Reduced access to labour from the extended family. 
∑ Increase in the size of cocoa holdings (insufficient family labour relative 
to area of cocoa planted). 








The high mobility of family members, mostly male, was also a factor affecting 
access to household labour.  Much village out-migration was related to 
education and marriage.  Other reasons included recreational activities and 
visits to relatives living elsewhere (Lummani & Nailina, 2001).   
 
The use of hired labour to overcome household labour shortages is limited and 
sporadic.  Omuru et al. (2001) reported 37% of sample households employed 
hired labour during their 12 month survey period, mostly for cocoa harvesting 
tasks.  Ghodake et al. (1995), on the other hand, found that the use of hired 
labour was most often restricted to large laborious tasks such as establishing 
and rehabilitating cocoa, and not for harvesting.  Whilst some smallholders 
employ hired labour to overcome household labour shortages, they appear to be 
sensitive to changes in the wage rates for hired labour (Omuru & Fleming, 
2001).   
 
 Low Levels of Block Maintenance 
Ghodake et al. (1995) identified poor farm management practices as a major 
constraint on cocoa production, which may be related to the labour constraints 
discussed above.  Weeds, pests and disease control and cocoa and shade 
pruning were highly variable among cocoa growers, and amongst cocoa blocks 
belonging to individual growers.  Mature cocoa blocks were “very often grossly 
overshaded” by Gliricidia shade trees (1995, p.106), and had “high levels” of 
pest infestations (1995, p.105).  Pest infestations were present on 40% of 
surveyed cocoa blocks, and “on most farms cocoa suffered from substantial 
economic losses” due to insect damage (1995, p.107).  Rarely were the 
recommended chemicals or other control measures applied to manage cocoa 
pests and diseases, and even on moderately well-managed blocks, management 
practices were either incorrect or inadequate.   
 
Other smallholder cocoa studies conducted on the Gazelle Peninsula have 
similarly reported inadequate weeding, pruning, shade control and pest and 
disease control (e.g., Nicholls, 1989; Yarbro & Noble, 1989; George, 1994; 
Omuru et al., 2001).  In a sample of 100 farmers in ENB, Omuru et al. (2001) 
found that 82% and 73% of farmers identified cocoa pests and cocoa diseases 
respectively as the most important factors limiting cocoa production.  The same 
study reported the ratio of diseased to healthy pods on five randomly selected 
cocoa trees within a 20 m radius of each other on each cocoa holding.  Disease 
rates varied across ten field sites, with an average of 17.3% of total pods per 





Several factors contributed to poor management levels, including low cocoa 
prices, labour shortages and inadequate knowledge of proper management 
practices.  It is possible that the effects of inadequate levels of maintenance of 
cocoa blocks have been exacerbated by some of the new hybrid cocoa varieties 
that require high levels of management inputs (e.g., weeding, shade control, and 
pruning — see Chapter 7). 
 
 Land Shortages 
Several studies conducted in ENB and the Gazelle Peninsula note land 
shortages as constraints on expanding cocoa production in the province (e.g., 
Granger, 1971; Godyn, 1974; Fenbury, 1978; Ghodake et al., 1995; Lummani 
& Nailina, 2001; Lowe, 2006).  Whilst many of these same studies, spanning 30 
years, also provide data on average size of cocoa holding per household, 
identifying a trend in the average size of cocoa holdings is difficult because 
land availability is highly variable across council wards in ENB and the Gazelle 
Peninsula, and also within and between village clans and extended families.  
Moreover, none of the above studies provides detailed analysis of the various 
ways in which land shortages affect production beyond limiting the area for 
cocoa expansion. 
 
As Epstein (1969) noted in the 1960s, as well as others since then (e.g., 
Salisbury, 1970; Nicholls, 1989; Ghodake et al., 1995; Lowe, 2006), various 
strategies have been employed by smallholders to overcome land constraints to 
secure land for cocoa.  Such strategies have included: a shift away from 
matrilineal and communal land tenure to more patrilineal and individual tenure 
systems; reassessment of traditional land-use categories, the ‘purchase’ of 
customary land; and the acquisition of government-leased land on the 
agricultural land settlement schemes in ENB and West New Britain.  For 
example, Ghodake et al. (1995) noted 58% of cocoa blocks and over 60% of 
food gardens were located on ‘purchased’ land (see Chapter 4 for further 
discussion of ‘purchased’ land)1.  
 
To date, research has not examined the influence of land shortages or the types 
of tenure (e.g., ‘purchase’, leasehold or customary land) on smallholder 
productivity, farm size, farm management and investment practices.  To do so 
would be a difficult and complex exercise.  In the study by Ghodake et al. 
(1995), smallholders identified land shortages as the major constraint on 
agricultural production, and for many smallholders, ‘purchasing’ land was their 
only way to increase production.  They noted that some cocoa farmers were 




about their tenure rights in the future.  When tenure rights to cocoa planted on 
customary land are disputed, investment in, and maintenance of, the cocoa 
block typically ceases.  This does not necessarily mean that planting cocoa on 
‘purchased’ land will lead to increased cocoa production.  As Ghodake et al. 
(1995) found, some smallholders were ‘purchasing’ land to plant cocoa, not to 
overcome present land constraints, but rather to secure land for their children’s 
needs in the future.  The productivity of cocoa stands on such ‘purchased’ land 
may therefore be very low.   
 
 Cocoa Prices 
Most smallholder studies conducted on the Gazelle Peninsula have noted the 
influence of cocoa prices on smallholder production (e.g., Godyn, 1974; 
George, 1994; Ghodake et al., 1995; Omuru et al., 2001).  Papua New Guinean 
commodity crop producers are considered to be price sensitive (i.e., smallholder 
production levels tend to be positively correlated with price).  However, price 
interacts with production in several ways.  Omuru et al. (2001) found that 85% 
of surveyed cocoa farmers in ENB said they would increase plantings of cocoa 
if prices were higher.  Other studies on the Gazelle Peninsula report that cocoa 
maintenance levels and farm investment levels appear to decline with falling 
prices (e.g., Godyn, 1974; Moxon, 1983 cited in Ghodake et al., 1995).  During 
times of depressed prices, smallholders are also more likely to search for 
alternative farm and non-farm income sources (Godyn, 1974). However, 
Ghodake et al. (1995) also note that poor block management was evident 
during times of “very high” world prices (1995, p.124).  The impact of low 
cocoa prices on access to family or hired labour for cocoa production has not 
been adequately explored.    
 
 Present Study 
In the present study smallholders were asked to identify the four main 
constraints on cocoa production. The top four, in declining order of importance 
were:  
∑ theft of cocoa pods (in some cases, an indication of under-harvesting) 
(27%); 
∑ poor block condition (overgrown cocoa trees, over-shading and high 
levels of pests and diseases) (26%); 
∑ labour shortages (19%); 
∑ limited knowledge of proper block management practices (especially 





Relatively high wet bean prices during the survey period meant that theft was 
most often identified by smallholders as a constraint on production, with ‘poor 
block condition’ ranked a close second.  Theft undermines smallholder 
motivation in a similar way to poor block condition.  When the most accessible 
and easily harvested pods are stolen only the pods that are more difficult to 
harvest remain, so more labour is required to harvest each kilogram of wet 
bean.   
 
Extension officers identified a similar set of constraints on smallholder 
production (apart from pod theft which only smallholders identified) during a 
workshop on smallholder production on the Gazelle Peninsula (Table 2.1).  The 
similarities in the constraints on production identified by smallholders and 
extension officers in the present study and those outlined above in earlier 
studies on the Gazelle Peninsula (in particular labour shortages and low levels 
of block maintenance), point to a set of problems that have been known for a 
long time by the industry.   
 
The following four chapters explore the underlying socio-economic factors that 
make these on-going problems difficult to resolve using conventional extension 
strategies.  The next chapter begins with a review of cocoa holdings and 







Smallholder Cocoa Holdings and Land Tenure 
 
This chapter presents an overview of smallholder cocoa holdings in terms of 
size and land tenure regimes in the two survey LLG areas of Kokopo-
Vunamami and Livuan-Reimbar to provide a background to the discussion in 
the following chapters of how household livelihood strategies interact with 
cocoa production to influence productivity.  It provides insights into how tenure 
regimes are changing in the study area in response to land shortages and how 
these changes are affecting cocoa production.   
 
 Cocoa Holdings 
There is great variation in the characteristics of the cocoa holdings among 
smallholders in the two LLG areas (Table 4.1).  Time and logistical constraints 
meant that it was not possible to physically survey smallholder blocks to 
ascertain the size of holdings.  Instead, smallholders were asked how many 
cocoa trees they owned in each block and these numbers were used to calculate 
the area planted to cocoa by each household.  Average size of cocoa holding 
among survey households was 4.8 ha for Kokopo-Vunamami and 1.7 ha for 
Livuan-Reimbar LLG areas.  These data are compared with data from other 
smallholder studies in ENB in Table 4.2.   
 
Apart from Godyn’s 1.8 ha average household size of cocoa holdings reported 
in 1974, all later studies, with the exception of the Livuan-Reimbar LLG data, 
have noted relatively large average cocoa holdings per household.  These 
holdings are considered large given the labour required to adequately maintain a 
management-intensive crop such as cocoa.  Ghodake et al. (1995, p.125) 
suggest that “one full-time labour unit per 3 hectares is required to implement 
an effective cocoa management package”.  Similarly, G. McNally (NGIP-
Newmark, pers. comm., 2005) estimates one full-time labour unit per 2.5 
hectares is required for cocoa to be fully harvested and maintained efficiently.  
Amongst the study households in the Kokopo-Vunamami LLG and Livuan-
Reimbar LLG villages, average household sizes were 6 and 5.2 respectively, 
with 61% of sample households with children in the school-age range of 5-14, 
most of whom were attending school1.  In addition, some older children and 
young adults were attending high school or vocational college2.  However, 
despite relatively high rates of school attendance, there appears to be sufficient 










Median area of cocoa 
per household (ha)* 
4.8 ha 1.7 ha 3.25 ha 
Mean number of 
cocoa blocks per HH 
3.2 2.4 2.8 
Two most common 










Mean year of planting 1991 1995 1992 
Per cent of growers 
who increased area 
under production in 







Per cent of growers 
whose areas under 
production contracted 







Per cent of growers 
whose area under 
production remained 








Per cent of cocoa 
blocks planted under 
coconuts 
91% 12% 58% 
Per cent of growers 
owning or part-








Most common form 










Data based on socio-economic survey.   
*    Reasonably accurate data on area under cocoa cultivation were obtained from 53 smallholders. 
** The higher than expected figure for fermentary ownership is due to smallholders being asked about 
ownership/part ownership rather than if they were the registered operator of a fermentary.  Part-ownership 
in fermentaries is common.  Also, it is likely people mentioned fermentaries that are no longer working, 
and/or fermentaries that they may not be used regularly because they do not have sufficient quantities of 
cocoa for drying, or as a part-owner, they have restricted access to its use.  Hence the figures do not reflect 






Table 4.2. Average area of smallholder cocoa holdings for ENB from 
1968-2007. 
Year/authors Average area of cocoa 
holdings per household  
Study location 
1974 (Godyn) 
1989 (Yarbro & Noble) 
1995 (Ghodake et al.) 
2001 (Omuru et al.) 
2007 Present study 
 
 


















* Size of household cocoa holdings varied from 0.2 to 30 ha. No figure for median size of household cocoa 
holdings provided. 
** 2.63 ha is the estimated average area planted to cocoa taking into account cocoa trees that have died and 
not been replanted (Omuru et  al., 2001).   
 
LLG villages where the median size of cocoa holding is 1.7 ha (Table 4.1).  
That smallholder productivity is so low suggests that other factors are working 
to constrain the supply of household labour for cocoa production (see Chapter 
5).   
 
Although the present study did not find a correlation between household size 
and area of cocoa holding, there was a strong positive correlation between the 
size of cocoa holdings and the age of growers (Figure 4.1).   
 
It is likely that many elderly growers have allocated some of their holdings to 
their sons or permit their adult sons access to harvest their cocoa holdings, and 
therefore hold the cocoa only in name.  However, the larger size of cocoa 
holdings controlled by older growers has implications for block maintenance, 
replanting and investments in farm inputs.  Most elderly growers visited as part 
of the weekly surveys and interviewed for the socio-economic survey (Chapter 
2) could be described as ‘retired’ or ‘semi retired’ because they were no longer 
actively participating in cocoa production.  Typically, they gave away harvest 
rounds and/or relied on their sons, nephews, adoptees or grandchildren to 
harvest or weed the cocoa block.  For some of these elderly or senior household 
heads, the motivation to maintain their control over cocoa production has two 
elements: 1) the social prestige and status that comes from being able to allocate 
harvest rounds to relatives or to donate harvests to the church; and 2) 
maintaining production within the household for as long as possible so that 
tenure rights to the cocoa block are not transferred too early to their sisters’ 




Age of Grower vs Coca Area (Blocks < 6 Ha)


















Figure 4.1.  Age of grower and size of cocoa holdings, Gazelle Peninsula. 
 
 
Cocoa varieties cultivated by respondents ranged from early plantings of 
Trinitario (known locally as German cocoa) through to cocoa hybrids (SG2) 
released in the mid 1990s.  The most common varieties of cocoa held by 
smallholders were SG2, followed by SG2 Modified (Table 4.1).  The high 
yielding hybrid clones that were released officially in 2003 were not found 
among sample households, although some planting had been undertaken by a 
small number of growers in the LLG areas sampled.   
 
Most cocoa (91%) in Kokopo-Vunamami LLG is planted under coconuts, 
(Table 4.1) and many smallholders plant additional shade trees such as marmar, 
Glircidia, bananas, fruit trees and betel nut.  In the Livuan-Reimbar LLG where 
pest damage to coconuts is a major constraint on coconut cultivation, only 12% 
of cocoa is planted under coconut:  Gliricidia is the most common shade tree.  
Gliricidia, unlike coconut shade, requires regular pruning to prevent excessive 
shading of cocoa.  Further discussion of shade control practices is provided in 
Chapter 7. 
 
Cocoa plantings have been increasing in both study sites over the last five 
years.  In the Livuan-Reimbar LLG 43% of sample households claimed they 
had expanded their cocoa holdings, compared with 35% of households in the 




smallholders in the Livuan-Reimbar LLG who expanded their cocoa holdings 
reflects the recent settlement and planting of smallholder cocoa on Tabaule and 
Bulupa lands. For some smallholders their cocoa holdings had decreased in size 
(Table 4.1).  The two most common factors cited by smallholders for the 
contraction of their cocoa holdings were labour shortages (15%) and tree 
mortality due to pests, diseases and poor block condition (15%) (see Chapter 7 
for further discussion). 
 
 Cocoa Land Tenure 
Smallholder cash crop production, management and investment decisions may 
be influenced by the type of land tenure regime governing cocoa blocks.  In the 
survey areas, cocoa is planted on land governed by four main types of land 
tenure arrangements.  These include: 
1. Customary tenure. 
2. ‘Reserve’ Land. 
3. ‘Purchase’ Land. 
4. State Agricultural Leasehold Land. 
 
Customary land tenure remains the most common form of tenure for cocoa 
production in the northeast Gazelle, although as shown in Table 4.3 there are 
considerable differences between the two study sites in the proportions of cocoa 
blocks under different land tenure arrangements.  
 




























































*   See text for definitions of land tenure types. 








 Customary Land 
Customary land is defined as land that has remained under the control of the 
clan (vunatarai) and has not been alienated by the State or held under private or 
mission control for plantations or other land uses.  Customary land on the 
Gazelle Peninsula is generally governed by matrilineal inheritance principles.  
A family may plant, harvest and manage cocoa planted on matrilineal land 
belonging to the male household head (father), if alive, or the female household 
head (mother).  Cocoa planted on matrilineal customary land is typically 
inherited by a man’s sisters’ children, and not his own children.  His own 
children have land tenure rights in the natal clan of his wife, that is, their 
mother’s clan.  In practice deviations from this matrilineal ideal are common, 
even as early as the 1950s (see Epstein, 1969; Salisbury, 1970; Lowe, 2006), 
and matrilineal inheritance rules are not always straightforward.  Claims on 
cocoa blocks may be exercised by individuals (especially children) who have 
invested considerable time and labour in the cocoa block.  Typically, these 
claims and disputes over cocoa planted on customary land arise following the 
death of the father.  For example, there are instances of children of the deceased 
seeking valuations of their cocoa blocks in order to claim compensation from 
their father’s clan for their labour and assets invested in the block (W. Mapua, 
CCI, pers. comm., 2005). 
 
Among surveyed smallholders in the Kokopo-Vunamami and Livuan-Reimbar 
LLG areas, 37% and 64% of cocoa blocks respectively, were planted on 
customary land.  The relatively small proportion of cocoa blocks planted on 
customary land by smallholders in the Kokopo-Vunamami LLG villages 
reflects in part the long history of contact with colonial administrators and 
traders during which time land was alienated from customary ownership (see 
below for further discussion).  Another important reason for the relatively small 
number of cocoa blocks on customary land in Kokopo-Vunamami LLG villages 
is that more recently villagers have commenced ‘selling’ exclusive rights to 
customary land to other clan members.  These ‘purchases’ of customary land 













When Tolai villagers refer to ‘reserve’ land they mean land under Freehold 
Title which previously was Freehold State Reserve Land, Native Reserve or 
Foreshore Reserve Land and which at some time during the late Nineteenth or 
Twentieth Century was land: 
∑ Alienated from customary ownership by the German colonial or 
Australian government administrations, or purchased by the State. 
∑ ‘Purchased’ or acquired by overseas traders, private plantation owners 
or Christian missions for plantations or other purposes. 
∑ Granted as a gift to Christian missions and overseas traders.  Early 
missions and some traders were given ‘access rights’ to land following a 
‘gift’, such as food or shell money, which represented a token payment 
for user rights to the land (see also Salisbury, 1970).   
 
Thirty-two per cent and fifteen per cent of smallholder cocoa in the Kokopo-
Vunamami LLG and Livuan-Reimbar LLG villages respectively was planted on 
reserve land.  Most reserve land in these LLG areas was previously Native 
Reserve land or land under privately owned copra/cocoa plantations.  The larger 
proportion of cocoa planted on reserve land in the Kokopo-Vunamami LLG 
villages than in the Livuan-Reimbar villages, draws attention to how extensive 
land alienation was in the eastern portion of the peninsula.  Some of the first 
land ‘sold’ by Ulautavia Village was to ‘Queen’ Emma Forsayth, a noteworthy 
American-Samoan trader (smallholder interview) in the Kokopo area in the late 
Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century.  Rowley (1965 in Epstein, 1969 p.24) 
also noted that by 1914, approximately 39% of arable land on the Gazelle 
Peninsula had been alienated by the German administration.  Some of the land 
that was alienated during the German colonial period was later subdivided into 
land parcels for State lease purposes, while the remaining land became State 
Reserve land for future purposes.   
 
Following PNG’s political independence in 1975, the new government inherited 
the alienated land from the Australian administration.   Portions of alienated 
State Reserve land were returned to customary landowners (W. Reven, Lands 
Office, Kokopo, pers. comm., 2005).  Also, under the Australian 
administration’s plantation redistribution scheme of the early 1970s, the 
administration purchased plantations from foreigners and sold the land to 
individuals and customary landowning groups (Incorporated Landowner 
Groups).  When the purchase was complete the land was converted to Freehold 
Title and returned to the customary landowning group (or individual)3.  The 




to pave the way for greater participation by Papua New Guineans in agricultural 
production (W. Reven, Lands Office, Kokopo, pers. comm., 2005).  
 
Many landowning groups have succeeded in purchasing and gaining freehold 
title over the land through the scheme, but other groups have failed due to 
competing ownership claims on the land.  In some cases, individuals and 
Incorporated Landowner Groups have raised funds from their communities and 
made payments for the return of the land, but to date, they are still awaiting a 
decision on the ownership of the land intended for purchase (M. Tabar, CCI, 
pers. comm., 2005).  
 
Typically, land purchased from the government was subdivided among clan 
members, although the land subdivision by clan leaders sometimes provided an 
opportunity for non-clan members to gain access to the land4.  According to 
villagers, the portion of subdivided land allocated to each clan member became 
their individual property for one generation to be inherited by a man’s sons and 
daughters.  Thus, ‘reserve’ land planted to cocoa can be passed onto 
smallholders’ children, and it is free of matrilineal inheritance claims from the 
wider clan group.  
 
Tabaule and Bulupa areas consist largely of ‘reserve’ and ‘purchase’ land.  
After independence in 1975 clan leaders from Vunalaiting Village began 
negotiations with the Lands Department for the return of alienated land to the 
clan leaders on behalf of the customary landowners.  In the early 1980s, when 
the ‘reserve’ land was returned to the claimants it was subdivided amongst 
members of the customary landowning group and a small portion of less 
desirable land (e.g., steep slopes) was sold to non-clan members (typically 
relatives or friends of clan leaders).  Some Tabaule and Bulupa smallholders 
continue to maintain cocoa blocks in their home villages or in the villages of 
their wives where their sons will hold tenure rights in the future.   
 
Purchase Land 
‘Purchase’ land was previously customary land or returned alienated State 
Reserve land, sold to a clan or non-clan member.  The purchase of land to plant 
cocoa and overcome land shortages has been occurring on the Gazelle 
Peninsula for at least several decades (Salisbury, 1970; Bourke, 1976; Ghodake 
et al., 1995; Lowe, 2006).  Ideally, sales of customary land must be approved 
by all clan members before the land is sold and transferred to freehold tenure by 
the Lands Office.  The vendor and the purchaser sign a customary land sale 




that the vendor’s rights, entitlements and interests on the purchased land are to 
be transferred to the purchaser.  Under formal processes, the community has a 
period of one month after the announcement or advertisement of the sale to 
lodge an objection with the ward councillor before the sale agreement is signed 
by the LLG President and forwarded to the Lands Department for approval of 
the purchase and transfer of customary land to freehold tenure (Ereman Peril 
and Willian Peren, Lands Office, Kokopo, pers. comm., 2005).  Only when the 
purchase price is fully paid are the vendor’s rights, entitlements and interests 
transferred to the purchaser.  Following approval of the sale by the Lands 
Department, the purchaser may decide to register the land (through the Land 
Tenure Conversion Act) and gain a certificate of title (freehold). 
 
Over the last three decades there has been considerable interest in converting 
customary land planted to cocoa to individual freehold title.  In effect, the 
conversion to freehold invalidates the matrilineal inheritance rights to the land 
of a man’s sisters’ sons and restarts a new matrilineal system based on a man’s 
children.  This is most common among men wishing to transfer cocoa holdings 
to their sons rather than to their nephews.     
 
Commonly, customary land is transferred to individual/family ownership 
through payment of shell money and/or cash to the clan5.  Although the 
procedures vary amongst the villages of the Gazelle Peninsula, the payment for 
land is often accompanied by a feast in which all clan members participate and 
acknowledge the transfer of the land to someone outside the matrilineal clan: 
that is, a man’s sons rather than his sisters’ sons.  The payment ideally removes 
matrilineal inheritance claims on the land, allowing the children of the 
purchaser to inherit the cocoa block.  However, the payment does not remove 
matrilineal inheritance claims in perpetuity: for each generation the daughters 
assume primary rights to the land.  For patrilineal inheritance to be validated, 
each generation of males who would like their sons to inherit the land must pay 
compensation to their sisters and/or fulfil other kinship obligations to them.  If 
these conditions are not met, the land can revert to matrilineal rules of 
inheritance, which is the default inheritance system.  Thus, purchasing land 









In the two LLG areas of Kokopo-Vunamami and Livuan-Reimbar 23% and 
14% of cocoa stands, respectively, were planted on ‘purchase’ land.  In the 
villages of Ulautava and Tinganavudu some clans have stopped selling clan 
land because of a perception of emerging land shortages.  Like other villages in 
PNG where land pressures exist, clan members can access land for temporary 
subsistence gardens, but access to land for perennial cash crops is much more 
tightly controlled.  In these situations, some young families are purchasing land 
away from their home villages, especially in the relatively sparsely populated 
region of the Bainings.  They are purchasing land in these areas to secure their 
children’s future.  
 
The desire to purchase land on behalf of children and plant it to cocoa in 
anticipation of future land shortages means that tracts of land have been planted 
to cocoa for future household livelihood security rather than for current 
household needs (see also Ghodake et al., 1995).  Expanding cocoa holdings to 
lock up land for future needs has implications for harvesting rates and pest and 
disease problems, particularly if those purchasing land already have adequate 
cocoa to meet their current income needs.  Similar observations were made in 
some villages growing oil palm in West New Britain Province, where some 
families were securing clan land for their children by planting it to oil palm.  
This practice was especially common in villages where customary land was 
being sold to non-clan members (Koczberski et al., 2001).   
 
Agricultural Leasehold Land 
Agricultural leasehold land is State land leased to individuals on 99 year leases.  
Several agricultural land settlement schemes (LSSs) based on leasehold tenure 
were established on the Gazelle Peninsula to promote smallholder cocoa 
production (see Spinks et al., 1964; Singh, 1967; Fenbury, 1978).  They are the 
Keravat, Vudal, Tokiala, Warangoi, Sigute, Ilugi, Mandras, Vunapaliting and 
Nengmutka LSSs.  Leaseholders, the majority of whom were from the Gazelle 
Peninsula, were allocated 6-10 ha plots of land for the planting of cocoa.   
 
The first LSS to be established was the Vudal Scheme, followed by settlements 
at Warangoi in 1959 and Ilugi in 1960 (Spinks et al., 1964; Singh, 1967).  In the 
late 1980s, with ADB funding, Sigute LSS was expanded to include 
approximately 127 new 6.5 ha blocks, and after the volcanic eruption at Rabaul 
in 1994 some further agricultural leases were allocated to families to resettle on 
Sigute LSS.  In total, approximately 30,000 ha are under agricultural leases in 





Similar to the oil palm agricultural LSSs in WNB, many of the LSSs on the 
Gazelle Peninsula that were established in the 1950s and 1960s are now 
experiencing population and economic pressures as second and third generation 
settlers continue residing on their parents’ block (Mary Dadatliu, Lands Office, 
Kokopo, pers. comm., 2005).  Further, as the original leaseholders pass away, 
there has been an increase in disputed leases coming before the Lands Office in 
Kokopo.  There have been numerous incidences of the inheritance of LSS 
leasehold blocks by settlers’ children being contested by matrilineal relatives.  
Customary practices (matrilineal inheritance) in terms of land inheritance do 
not apply to state leasehold land.  Disputes between brothers and sisters over 
the transfer of leasehold title are becoming increasingly common.  Often 
disputes over inheritance of leasehold blocks are exacerbated because the 
leaseholder did not leave a will6.  Protracted disputes over inheritance of cocoa 
blocks can lead to production being disrupted until the dispute is resolved. 
 
Land Tenure and Cocoa Production 
To conclude, the large numbers of smallholders with cocoa planted on 
‘purchase’ and reserve land is indicative of the land shortages present on the 
Gazelle Peninsula, as is the trend for smallholders to pursue strategies to 
accumulate tenure rights to land within the family.  As this chapter has shown, 
people are working out various ways to resolve inheritance issues in the context 
of land shortages and their considerable investments of labour and capital in 
their cocoa blocks.   
 
The desire to convert customary land to individual title reveals three major 
trends.  First, it reveals a shift in attitudes and values in which sons are given 
preference over nephews in the inheritance of cocoa blocks.  Second, it is 
possible that the desire to convert customary land to ‘purchase’ land may reflect 
smallholders’ capital and labour investments in their cocoa blocks.  Unlike 
temporary food gardens which may be in production for a few years before 
reverting to the common pool of fallow land, cocoa blocks represent 
considerable long-term labour investments and income potential, and for this 
reason there is a desire to keep these assets within the family.  Third, the trend 
to transfer land under cocoa from customary tenure to individual title also 
reflects shifts in residence patterns and social and cultural changes occurring on 
the Gazelle Peninsula.  For example, it was customary for male children to 
move back to their mother’s village and acquire land through their mother or 




living on their father’s land.  This is a reminder of the rapidly changing socio-
cultural environment in which smallholder production occurs. 
 
This study does not have sufficient data to make conclusive statements 
regarding the effects of land tenure on cocoa productivity.  From interviews 
with smallholders and extension officers, it is clear that planting cocoa on 
individually registered land does not isolate the land from potential disputes and 
inheritance claims from matrilineal kin.  Nor does it appear that customary land 
tenure always serves as a disincentive to replanting cocoa or is a constraint on 
production decisions.  Our observations suggest low levels of block 
maintenance (especially minimal pruning of cocoa trees and shade trees – see 
Chapter 7) were common across a range of different tenure regimes.  Further, 
any relationship between type of land tenure regime and smallholder 
productivity is likely to be masked by the influence of land shortages.  The 
practice of tying up land for children’s future needs by planting it with cocoa 
means that block productivity may bear little relation to type of land tenure.  
This, of course, has implications for cocoa farm management and investment 
practices.  In the next chapter we begin this analysis with an investigation of 






Household Income and Labour Strategies among 
Cocoa Producers 
 
This chapter documents the importance of cocoa production within the broader 
income and labour portfolio of cocoa producing households in the two study 
areas.  It draws on data collected during weekly visits to fourteen families and a 
larger socio-economic survey of 93 cocoa producing families (see Chapter 2 for 
details).  Understanding household income and labour strategies is important 
for explaining productivity because most smallholder households depend on 
labour for cocoa from the family and extended family, with very few employing 
hired labour to overcome labour shortages.  As identified in other studies on the 
Gazelle Peninsula, household labour shortages are a significant constraint on 
smallholder production (Ghodake et al., 1995; Lummani & Nailina, 2001; 
Omuru & Fleming, 2001).  
 
 Household Income Portfolio  
We estimate annual average income for cocoa smallholders of K1,871 for dry 
bean sellers and K408 for wet bean sellers1. In the socio-economic survey, 71% 
and 100% of male household heads at Kokopo-Vunamami LLG and Livuan-
Reimbar LLG areas respectively identified cocoa as the most important income 
source for the household, followed by copra and local marketing (Table 5.1).  
The relative importance of each income source varies between the two LLG 
areas and between genders.  In the Livuan-Reimbar LLG area, household 
dependence on cocoa income is notably higher than for households in the 
Kokopo-Vunamami LLG area where copra is also important (Table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.1 also reveals that cocoa producing households are not solely producing 
cocoa.  Indeed, as depicted more clearly in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 a salient feature 
of cocoa producing households is the diversity of income sources and the wide 
range of livelihood activities in which they are engaged (see also Omuru et al., 
2001).  The average number of income sources per household is 6.2 at Kokopo-
Vunamami LLG and 4.6 at Livuan-Reimbar LLG.   
 
The main farm and non-farm income sources other than cocoa are copra, local 
marketing of garden foods and betel nut, vanilla, livestock and tradestores 
(Figure 5.1).  Vanilla production is a recent supplementary income source and 





Table 5.1. Most important income sources for men and women in the Kokopo-






      Male               Female  
      (%)                   (%)  
 
Livuan-Reimbar LLG 
      Male               Female  
       (%)                  (%) 
Cocoa 71 26 100 45 
Copra 25 2.2 — — 
Local  
Marketing 
2.2 48 — 53 
Wage 
Employment 
— 8.7 — 2 
Village  
Business 
— 10.9 — — 
 
In 1995, Ghodake et al. noted that none of the cocoa smallholders in their 
Gazelle Peninsula sample grew vanilla, despite high world prices prevailing at 
the time of their fieldwork.  The recent rapid uptake of vanilla by smallholders 
on the Gazelle Peninsula is partly a response to greater market access and high 
prices during the period 2000-2004. It is also a reflection of smallholders’ 
desire to diversify and increase their incomes.  At the time of the socio-
economic survey in December 2003, prices for vanilla were beginning to 
decline, and by mid 2005 vanilla prices and market access had both been 
substantially reduced, causing great disappointment and frustration for growers. 
 
Whilst many of the income activities depicted in Figure 5.1 contribute less to 
total household income than cocoa, and some provide very irregular sources of 
income (e.g., sales of vanilla or casual labouring), the range of household 
income sources highlights the many economic activities pulling on 
smallholders’ time, labour and, in some cases, investment capital (e.g., for 
tradestores and vehicles) (Figure 5.2).  It is more common for smallholders to 
invest cocoa income in new or ongoing businesses such as tradestores, poultry 
and transport businesses, which have high social status, than to reinvest their 
earnings in their cocoa blocks for rehabilitation, replanting, or employing hired 
labour for block maintenance tasks.  Omuru (2001) reported that only 4% of the 
cocoa income of ENB smallholders was reinvested in their blocks.  
Often during cocoa flushes there is considerable social pressure on 
growers to invest cocoa income in communal bisnis enterprises that 
give status to the group.  Some interviewees reported making these investments 
in the knowledge that there was little probability of these businesses being 



















































































KOKOPO VUNAMAMI REIMBER LIVUAN  
Figure 5.1. Non-cocoa income sources of cocoa smallholder households at 
Kokopo-Vunamami and Livuan-Reimbar LLG areas (source: socio-economic 
survey). 
 



















































































































Figure 5.2. Proportions of time allocated to different activities by cocoa 
smallholder households at Kokopo-Vunamami and Livuan-Reimbar LLGs 





Plate 5.1. Vanilla plot of cocoa farmer at Ulautava Village. 
 
 




   
Intra-household Income Distribution 
The diverse income sources of smallholder households (Figure 5.1) also reveal 
something about the income distribution within households.  Whilst cocoa may 
be the dominant income source for one or more family members, especially 
male household heads, other family members such as wives or co-resident 
married sons and daughters, may be more reliant on other income sources.  
When female household heads were asked separately from their husbands to 
rank their three main income sources, income from local markets was ranked 
higher than cocoa (Table 5.1).  Men, however, ranked cocoa as the main income 
source of the household (Table 5.1).  In the Kokopo-Vunamami LLG area, only 
26% of women ranked cocoa income above market income.  Local markets 
were considered the most important source of income for almost half (48%) of 
the women.  In the Livuan-Reimbar LLG area, 45% of women ranked cocoa as 
their most important income source, compared with 53% of women who stated 
market income was their primary income source (Table 5.1).   
 
The importance of local markets as an income source for women indicates 
where women are investing their time and labour, and suggests that women 
have greater control over market income compared with income from cocoa.  In 
cocoa production, women typically retain the income they earn from small 
harvests of wet bean, and the larger income from the more profitable dry bean 
production and sales is usually controlled by male household heads (see also 
Lummani, 2006 who reports a similar situation amongst cocoa households in 
the Buin District of Bougainville).  Men’s control over the bulk of the income 
from dry bean sales is similar to income distribution patterns within families 
found in other commodity crops in PNG, such as coffee, copra and oil palm.  In 
these other crops, men have tended to claim ownership rights over the bulk of 
the income, leaving women with a much smaller share of the total income, and 
a relatively lower rate of return on their labour compared with men.  As 
demonstrated in coffee and oil palm in PNG, the poor remuneration of women’s 
labour has been a major factor constraining the supply of female labour in 
coffee and oil palm production to the extent that potential production and 
income were significantly reduced (see Overfield, 1998; Koczberski et al., 








Portfolio of Household Labour Activities 
The diverse range of livelihood strategies pursued by cocoa producing 
smallholders is reflected in the patterns of labour allocation recorded amongst 
households participating in the weekly surveys.  As shown in Figures 5.3–5.6, 
households allocate their labour to a wide range of economic and social 
activities.  Moreover, most activities display marked gender differences in the 
time allocated to specific tasks, especially those related to income earning and 
household domestic and child/health care activities.  Differences are less 
marked between the sexes in the amounts of time allocated to subsistence, 
communal and leisure activities.   
 
Gender Differences in Labour Allocation in Cocoa, Copra and Local 
Marketing 
There are distinct differences between the two study sites in how men and 
women allocate their labour to the three main income activities of cocoa and 
copra production and local marketing of garden produce (Figures 5.3–5.6).  In 
the Kokopo-Vunamami LLG villages, where most households have combined 
cocoa-coconut holdings and sell wet bean predominantly (see below), men 
spend 12% and 18% of their total time on cocoa and copra respectively 
compared with 10% and 8% for women (Figure 5.5).  Whilst there is little 
difference between men and women in the time they allocate to cocoa, men 
devote more than twice as much time to copra production than do women 
(Figures 5.3 and 5.5).  Overall, copra production is the dominant economic 
activity of men (Figure 5.5), and the greater time men spend on copra compared 
with women relates largely to copra processing and marketing.  Processing 
copra is a long and laborious task that is spread over several days, and is 
undertaken largely by men.  The lengthy period of processing allows men a 


























































































































Female Male  
Fig 5.3. Sharing of tasks by gender at Kokopo-Vunamami LLG (source: weekly 
survey data). 
 






















































































































Female Male  





















































































































Female Male  
Fig 5.5. Activity by gender at Kokopo-Vunamami LLG (source: weekly survey 
data). 
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In the Livuan-Reimbar LLG villages, copra production is a minor activity for 
both men and women (Figure 5.6).  In contrast to Kokopo-Vunamami LLG 
villages, the main income earning activities in terms of labour time are cocoa 
production and marketing, where there are also distinct gender differences 
(Figure 5.4).  Men spend 30% and 12% of their time on cocoa production and 
market-related activities4 respectively, compared with 12% and 24% for women 
(Figure 5.6).  Interestingly, men in the Livuan-Reimbar LLG villages spend 
almost the same amount of time in cocoa production as do men spend on cocoa 
and copra production combined in the Kokopo-Vunamami LLG villages 
(Figures 5.5 and 5.6).  The differences in the labour allocated to cocoa and 
market-related activities by men and women in the Livuan-Reimbar LLG 
villages are depicted in Figure 5.4 which show women contribute less than a 
third of the labour to cocoa production, and men less than a one-half of the 
labour that is allocated to market income earning activities (including garden 
production for marketing).  Thus, cocoa production in the Livuan-Reimbar LLG 
villages, where dry bean processing is common (see below), is predominantly a 
male activity, while women direct their labour to income activities based on 
local marketing of garden produce.   
 
The gender division of labour in cocoa production for Livuan-Reimbar LLG 
villages presents an interesting contrast to Kokopo-Vunamami LLG villages.  
In the latter LLG villages, where wet bean sales predominate, labour allocated 
to cocoa production dominates the income earning activities of women, and 
women contribute around 45% of the labour to cocoa production (Figures 5.3 
and 5.5).  In contrast, in the Livuan-Reimbar LLG villages, where dry bean 
sales predominate, women’s share of the cocoa work relative to men is much 
less (Figure 5.4).   
 
Whilst there is not a rigid division of labour in the harvesting of cocoa, the 
lengthy process of fermenting and drying cocoa beans is typically a male 
activity.  Harvesting tasks are performed by men, women and children, and 
women’s labour contribution largely ceases once the wet bean is harvested and 
carried to the village fermentary.  Male family members (the husband and adult 
sons) tend to arrange transport of firewood for drying and they supervise the 
fermentation and drying process. The male household head typically takes 
responsibility for transporting the dry bean to the nearest town for sale.  As with 
copra, women’s contribution to processing is minimal.  Key differences in the 
labour strategies of wet and dry bean production are explained further in 





 Competing Demands on Labour 
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show that women’s labour contribution to commodity crop 
production (i.e. cocoa or cocoa/copra production) is much less than that of men.  
Given the wide range of activities in which men and women are involved, it is 
likely that, at times, these other activities (e.g., subsistence production, 
childcare, community activities, etc.) draw labour away from cocoa production 
(particularly block maintenance tasks).  Labour for cocoa may also be 
constrained by illness and health care requirements, both of which consumed a 
substantial amount of women’s time at Kokopo-Vunamami LLG villages 
(Figure 5.5).  High illness rates were reported during an exceptionally wet 
period in May-July 2004 (see Chapter 2) when many children and elderly 
villagers suffered from malaria and other illnesses.  The high illness rate in 
Kokopo-Vunamami LLG villages compared with Livuan-Reimbar LLG 
villages also reflects the older population in the former villages.   
 
Further support for the claim that labour for cocoa production may compete 
with other income and livelihood activities is derived from smallholders 
themselves.  When asked to identify what they viewed as the four main 
constraints on or barriers to improving cocoa production, labour shortages were 
ranked third behind poor block condition and the theft of cocoa pods.  These 
results concur with other smallholder studies on the Gazelle Peninsula that have 
identified labour shortages as a constraint on smallholder cocoa output (e.g., 
Ghodake et al., 1995; Lummani & Nailina, 2001).   
 
It is also apparent from Figure 5.2 that villagers place a great deal of importance 
on activities that are not directly related to cash income, but which are central 
for maintaining social and kinship networks and community cohesiveness (i.e., 
for maintaining social capital).  At times, these activities draw smallholders’ 
time and labour away from cocoa, but at other times they have the opposite 
effect by motivating smallholders to commit extra time and labour to cocoa 
production to raise funds for social purposes.  For example, villagers devote 
much time and labour to church, community and traditional activities (Figure 
5.2), and it is not uncommon for family members to make substantial cash 
donations to the church or to contribute financially to a community or 
customary event.  Often these financial contributions are either in the form of 
large cash donations/payments following the sale of cocoa to exporters or as 
bags of dry cocoa or copra.  Such church and community obligations remind us 
that cocoa production is not just to raise household income for consumption, 
but also serves important social purposes. In summary, cocoa smallholders 




as subsistence food production, other export cash crop production (e.g. copra 
and vanilla production), local marketing and community, customary and church 
activities. All these activities are important for maintaining the economic and 
social well-being of families, extended kinship groups and village communities.  
These non-cocoa pursuits influence the amount of time and labour committed 
by household members to cocoa production, resulting at times in labour 
shortages in cocoa production.  Further, the limited time women allocate to dry 
bean production relative to men is an important gender division of labour that 
may reflect men’s greater control over income from dry bean sales.   
 
In the next chapter we examine further the differences between wet and dry 
bean sellers and the range of other factors influencing the production strategies 











Wet Bean and Dry Bean Cocoa Production 
 
This chapter identifies and describes the factors (beyond access to processing 
facilities) that determine a household’s cocoa production strategy.  In particular 
the discussion focuses on the key differences in labour and farm management 
practices between households selling wet bean and those selling dry bean.  We 
estimated an annual income of K1,871 for dry bean sellers and K408 for wet 
bean sellers.  The considerably lower income of wet bean sellers relative to dry 
bean sellers has been noted in several smallholder studies on the Gazelle 
Peninsula and elsewhere in PNG (Table 6.1).  For example, in ENB Omuru 
(2005) noted that gross margins for smallholder farmers selling dry bean were 
69.4% higher than for those selling wet bean1.   
 
Table 6.1.  Annual wet and dry bean cocoa incomes for smallholders in PNG. 
Author (year) Wet Bean Annual Income Dry Bean Annual Income 




(East Sepik and 
Madang provinces)*. 
K2,200 – K2,300 
(East New Britain and 
Oro provinces)*. 
 
Lummani (2006) K269 
(Buin District, Bougainville). 
K477 





East New Britain). 
K1,871 
(Gazelle Peninsula, 
East New Britain). 
 
* Most smallholders surveyed in East Sepik and Madang Provinces sold wet bean, whilst in 
East New Britain and Oro Provinces most respondents sold dry bean. 
**  See Note 1 in Chapter 5 for income calculations. 
 
Because most ENB cocoa growers are wet bean sellers (Ghodake et al, 1995; 
Omuru et al., 2001), total cocoa income and returns to labour are lower than if 
smallholders were dry bean producers, and it is likely that cocoa productivity is 
also low.  The lower returns from wet bean sales than from dry bean sales have 
implications for the levels of farm investment, farm management practices, 







To identify ways to raise smallholder incomes and productivity it is first 
necessary to understand key differences in labour and farm management 
practices between wet and dry bean sellers. Using data gathered from the 
surveys and interviews with cocoa households in the Kokopo-Vunamami LLG 
and Livuan-Reimbar LLG areas, we sought answers to three sets of inter-related 
questions: 
 
1. What contribution does cocoa make to total household income for wet 
and dry bean producing households?  Do wet bean sellers pursue 
additional income sources to compensate for the low returns from 
selling wet bean? 
 
2. What effect does labour availability have on a household’s cocoa 
production strategy?  Do wet bean sellers have greater difficulty 
mobilising labour for harvesting than do dry bean producers? 
 
3. To what extent does the age and condition of a cocoa block influence 
the production strategy of a household?  Are old, unproductive and 
difficult-to-access blocks more likely to be associated with wet bean 
production strategies?  
 
Income Strategies of Wet Bean and Dry Bean Selling Households 
In this section we analyse the weekly income data for the three main sources of 
household income: cocoa, copra and local food marketing. This will enable us 
to examine differences in the types of income and labour strategies pursued by 
wet bean and dry bean households and how these strategies affect block 
maintenance and other investments in cocoa production. Whilst the sample size 
(see Chapter 2) at Kokopo-Vunamami and Livuan-Reimbar LLGs is too small 
to draw any firm conclusions for the Gazelle Peninsula, the analysis provides 
insights into some of the key differences between households selling wet bean 
and dry bean. 
 
The importance of cocoa to total household income is related to whether a 
household sells mainly wet or dry bean (Table 5.1). Dry bean households tend 
to be more narrowly focused on cocoa production than wet bean households, 
with the latter tending to have one or more non-cocoa incomes making an 
important contribution to total household income. For predominantly dry bean 
selling households, cocoa income constitutes 77% of total household income, 
and cocoa tends to be the major income source throughout the year across both 




the Livuan-Reimbar LLG area and, as shown in Table 5.1, cocoa dominates the 
income strategies of households in this LLG area. This was confirmed by the 
larger socio-economic survey which found that 100% of sample households in 
this LLG area reported selling dry bean predominantly.   
 
For households that sold primarily wet bean, income from marketing of garden 
produce and/or copra production was of greater relative importance to total 
household income than cocoa earnings for part or most of the year.  In wet bean 
selling households, income from cocoa constituted, on average, 40% of total 
household income.  The average income per wet bean sale of K17.00 (mean of 
24 sales/year) is much less than the average income of K374.22 (mean of 5 
sales/ year) earned for each dry bean sale.  Given the relatively low income 
earned from cocoa by wet bean sellers (Table 6.1), they are more likely to direct 
a larger proportion of household labour to other income activities where the 
returns to labour are better.  Indeed, in Kokopo-Vunamami LLG where most 
wet bean sellers resided, men committed more labour to copra than cocoa 
(Chapter 5).  As discussed further in Chapter 8, when a cocoa block is not 
providing sufficient income to meet the many cash demands on a family such as 
school fees, family members will divert their labour to more profitable activities 
and/or less labour-intensive activities.  In this way, wet and dry bean sellers 
appear to differ not only in the proportions of their total household incomes 
derived from cocoa, but also in their broader household labour and income 
strategies.   
 
Differences in income strategies of wet and dry bean sellers cannot be 
explained simply by dry bean sellers having better access to processing 
facilities or possessing larger cocoa holdings2.  Indeed, all but one wet bean 
seller household had larger holdings of cocoa than the dry bean seller 
households.  Although the small size of the sample limits the conclusions that 
can be drawn from these data, it appears that household income portfolios and 
cocoa production strategies are better explained by a range of other factors.  For 
example, when families settled at Tabaule and Bulupa in the Livuan-Reinbar 
LLG in the 1980s, they were unable to establish coconuts as cocoa shade 
because of the arrival in the province during the Second World War of the 
Oryctes Rhinoceros Beetle, a major pest of coconuts3.  Copra was therefore a 
much less significant income source for Tabaule and Bulupa families and only 
an option for those households that retained access rights to old coconut stands 
in their home villages.  In contrast, when cocoa was introduced in the 1960s and 
1970s to the Kokopo-Vunamami LLG area, where the majority of wet bean 




coconuts, providing villagers with income from two commodity crops.  Given 
the limited access to an alternative commodity crop (i.e., copra) at Tabaule and 
Bulupa, households allocate more labour to cocoa production and maximise 
their returns by selling almost all the cocoa crop as dry bean.   
 
Labour Strategies of Wet Bean and Dry Bean Selling Households 
Just as there are differences in the income strategies of wet and dry bean sellers, 
there are also important differences in the way that they organise and recruit 
labour for cocoa production.  Key differences in the cocoa production strategies 
of wet and dry bean households are summarised in Table 6.2. 
 
A significant difference between wet and dry bean sellers is that dry bean 
producers rely on a ready supply of labour from the household and extended 
family (Table 6.2).  The larger quantities of bean harvested and the longer 
periods of harvesting required for dry bean production involve a mean 4.4 
labourers working for 2.3 days per dry bean sale.  Much of this labour is 
provided by family members (especially males), with supplementary labour 
drawn from the extended family (harvesting and processing).   
 
Dry bean producers also require access to processing facilities (fermentary and 
dryer) and transport for carting firewood to the dryer and the processed crop to 
exporters in town (Plate 6.1).  Commonly, members of the same social and 
kinship groups share processing facilities, even though it is illegal for people 
without licenses from the Cocoa Board to operate cocoa fermentaries and 
dryers.  Several families in the weekly surveys producing dry bean did not have 
their own processing facilities and used fermentaries belonging to relatives.  
Also, male household heads rely on their sons and often other male relatives to 
assist with the fermentation and drying process.  The male household head 
supervising processing usually takes responsibility for the sale of dry bean and 
the distribution of the resultant income.  Hence, a dry bean household requires 
good access to labour from the immediate and extended family to be able to 
mobilise the large cooperative work groups necessary.  In contrast, wet bean 
sellers with shorter harvesting rounds and smaller quantities of harvested bean, 
are less dependent on cooperative labour strategies and rarely need to mobilise 
harvesting labour from the extended family.  Wet bean harvest groups are 
smaller than dry bean harvest groups with a mean of 1.78 harvesters working 








Table 6.2.  Key differences in cocoa production strategies between wet and dry 
bean sellers. 
Wet Bean Producers* Dry Bean Producers* 
 Duration of a harvest round short.  Average 
0.36 days. 
 Individual harvester or very small harvesting 
groups. Average 1.78 labourers per harvest 
round (1.38 adults and 0.39 children per 
harvest round)**. 
 Average number of labour days*** spent on 
a wet bean harvest is 0.68. 
 Women and children (female mostly) more 
likely than men to be involved in wet bean 
harvesting (48% of the total time and labour 
is contributed by adult women). 
 Recruitment of non-family labour less 
common, but if recruited mostly young 
females (9.6% of total labour is contributed 
by extended family). 
 Harvester tends to sell crop and control 
income earned. 
 Average weight of cocoa sold per harvest 
round is 17.7 kg. 
 Average income earned per harvest round is 
K17.00. 
 Income spent on immediate household 
consumption needs (e.g., tinned fish, rice, 
soap, kerosene) or for church donation. 
 Cocoa block nearest residence harvested 
more frequently than blocks further away. 
 Cocoa block maintenance negligible. 
 Transport costs nil or low (wet bean carried 
in bag or basket to processor for sale). 
 Beans sold locally, usually in village. 
 Longer harvest rounds.  Average 2.3 days.  
 More family co-operative harvests, 
involving most family members. 
 Average number of workers per harvest sale 
is 4.4 (average 3.3 adults and 1.1 children 
per harvest sale)**. 
 Average number of labour days*** per 
harvest sale is 10.46. 
 More adult males than females involved in 
dry bean harvesting (41% of the total time 
and labour contributed by men). 
 Recruitment of non-family labour more 
common, typically adult males (16.1% of 
labour contributed by extended family).   
 Male household head tends to sell crop and 
control distribution of income earned. 
 Average weight of dry cocoa sold per 
harvest round is 91.7 kg. 
 Average income earned per harvest sale 
K374.22. 
 Income saved and/or used for larger personal 
and household expenses (e.g., school fees, 
house building, customary payments and 
investment in other businesses such as 
tradestore stock, poultry or building 
materials). 
 Some block maintenance undertaken (almost 
entirely grass slashing). 
 Transport costs significant (wet bean to 
fermentary/dryer, firewood to dryer, dry 
bean to exporter in town). 
*     Data from 67 wet bean sales, and 41 dry bean sales among sample households during the 
two survey periods in 2003 and 2004.   
**    An adult is defined as anyone over the age of 14. 
***  A labour day is the average number of harvesting days multiplied by the number of 





         Plate 6.1. Transporting firewood and processed dry cocoa beans. 
 
 





Wet bean harvesting is typically undertaken by women usually working alone 
or with young children, with the cash income (kwik moni) spent on small items 
like store foods and other items for immediate consumption.  Women often 
claimed that these short harvesting visits were driven by the need to purchase an 
item for use that day or for church donations.  Less often, a husband and wife 
may work together to harvest wet bean.  In our sample households, most of the 
men working alone collecting wet bean were elderly and widowed.  Whilst 
relatives from the extended family contributed 9.6% of the harvesting labour for 
wet bean sales, their labour is recruited not so much to overcome labour 
shortages, but rather as a social obligation or goodwill gesture to help a relative.  
Many elderly households often called on their young grandchildren to assist 
with harvesting.  The children often shared some of the income or food that was 
purchased from the earnings from wet bean sales.   
 
Wet bean sellers are less dependent than dry bean producers on transport 
because the small harvests (17.7 kg) are usually sold locally and can be carried 
in a basket on foot to the buying point (Plate 6.2).   
 
 Labour Availability and the Production Strategies of Wet Bean and Dry 
Bean Sellers 
 
The different labour strategies and family and kinship networks mobilised for 
cocoa production by wet and dry bean selling households described above raise 
the question of whether wet bean households find it more difficult to mobilise 
labour than dry bean households.  The sample size was too small to draw firm 
conclusions.  Given the centrality of household labour in cocoa production and 
the minimal use of hired labour, access to family labour is likely to be a factor 
determining production levels and the type of production strategy (wet bean or 
dry bean) adopted by households.   
 
High production levels are contingent on an adequate supply of labour.  
Interview and survey data reveal that smallholder households with an adequate 
supply of labour for cocoa have certain characteristics.  These are summarised 
in Box 6.1. 
 
A significant feature of households where labour supply is easily mobilised is 
the good working relationships between the male household head and other 
family members.  Harmonious relationships among family members help 
ensure their ongoing commitment to and participation in cocoa production.  
This is particularly important for maintaining a dry bean production strategy 




Box 6.1.  Characteristics of households with an adequate supply of labour for 
cocoa production. 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY 
OF LABOUR FOR COCOA PRODUCTION  
 
Access to the labour of unmarried and/or married sons. 
 
Reside in multi-generational and extended family units (houses clustered together) 
with multi-household production units (for subsistence and cash cropping). 
 
Household works co-operatively and harmoniously as a family group. 
 
Household is willing to utilise indigenous mechanisms of labour mobilisation 
when necessary to maintain cocoa production during high crop periods. 
 
The head of the extended family unit (the father) maintains control over family 
labour (in particular the labour of adult sons). 
 
Few intra-household disputes over labour remuneration. 
 
Household head allocates cocoa harvests or cocoa beans to adult household 
members and other relatives. 
 
 
Harmonious working relationships within the family are dependent on 
individual family members being satisfied with their share of cocoa income 
(i.e., a perception that income distribution is fair and the household head is not 
wasting the income but contributing to the economic and social well-being of 
the family group).  By judiciously allocating harvest rounds to co-resident 
married sons and daughters, a male household head builds goodwill (social 
capital) that enables him to draw on the unpaid labour and support of his 
married children when necessary.  For instance, when a co-resident son assists 
his father with cocoa production, the son may expect his father to contribute to 
immediate and future expenses (such as school fees and bridewealth).  Thus, 
labour supply for cocoa production does not reflect only the demographic 
characteristics of the household (number of able-bodied workers).  The failure 
of the household head to meet obligations and behave in socially responsible 






Another important characteristic of households with adequate labour is their 
ability to utilise traditional mechanisms of labour mobilisation.  This can take 
many forms, and may involve long-term measures such as adoption of children 
or recruiting relatives (such as nephews who are short of land) to reside with the 
family.  More commonly, traditional strategies are short-term and may involve 
participation in reciprocal labour exchange groups (such as warvemal) that are 
usually based on kinship.  Each group member benefits from the pooled labour 
of other group members.  Labour exchange is usually employed for labour-
intensive tasks such as planting, grass slashing prior to harvesting, harvesting 
during high crop periods, and processing.   
 
Short-term strategies for mobilising labour are especially useful during flush 
periods when work demands are high and dry bean is produced.  These 
strategies are similar to traditional strategies of mobilising labour for 
subsistence production, and like them they lie outside the market economy and 
are not dependent on market-based relations of production.  In other words, 
they do not depend on wage labour.  People recruited through these strategies 
are commonly presented with cooked food and occasionally some cash as a 
token of appreciation for their gift of labour.  It would be incorrect to interpret 
such gifts of cash and food as market transactions.  The cash given is not 
viewed as a ‘payment’ for labour.  Growers made it clear during interviews that 
the cash given to family and relatives working on cocoa was a ‘present’ 
signifying the blockholder’s good relationship with the helper and appreciation 
for their help and generosity.  Often growers explained a gift to a helper as ‘mi 
hamamasim em tasol’ (pleasing) the helper.  Usually there is an obligation by 
the cocoa grower receiving the labour to reciprocate labour, money or support 
at some later date.  Those household heads adept at managing reciprocal labour 
exchanges are more able to ensure an adequate supply of labour during peak 
labour demand periods like the cocoa flush.   
 
We have already noted that one fifth of survey households identified labour 
shortages as a constraint on production.  Families experiencing labour shortages 
tend to have one or more of the characteristics listed in Box 6.2.  For a variety 
of reasons households experiencing labour shortages are unable or unwilling to 
overcome labour supply constraints by recruiting family labour, participating in 
reciprocal labour exchange strategies, or hiring labour.  The result is low levels 
of household cocoa production, which in turn is likely to be reflected in a wet 






Box 6.2.  Characteristics of households with labour supply constraints for cocoa 
production. 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH LABOUR SUPPLY 
CONSTRAINTS FOR COCOA PRODUCTION 
Demographic characteristics (e.g., small family size, young family with 
dependants, absence of adult family members, elderly household heads without 
co-resident sons, young family with preschool children). 
 
Short or long-term health problems of adult family members. 
 
Competing economic demands on household labour (e.g., formal employment, 
alternative cash crops). 
 
Non-economic activities competing with labour for cocoa production (e.g., 
customary activities, church activities). 
 
Under-utilisation of available family labour (e.g., inadequate remuneration of 
family members leads them to withdraw their labour from cocoa production). 
 
Perception that household head is not fulfilling his obligations to the family. 
 
Minimal use of traditional strategies of labour mobilisation (e.g., reciprocal 
exchange labour). 
 
Minimal use of hired labour. 
 
The characteristics of labour-short households listed in Box 6.2 indicate that 
labour constraints may be temporary (resulting from illness or the diversion of 
labour to other activities), or they may be more enduring because of household 
demographic factors, such as an elderly household head without co-resident 
sons (see Chapter 5). Sometimes, as pointed out above, family members are 
discouraged from providing labour when they feel they are not being adequately 
remunerated for their labour  As noted in Chapter 5, women commonly divert 
their labour away from certain types of export crop production when they 
believe that they, or their family as a whole, are not benefiting from the income 
earned.  Similarly, a young son seeking economic independence from his father 
may resent giving labour which he believes is not being remunerated fairly.  
Whilst we did not observe many cases of sons withdrawing their labour from 





Finally, it is also likely that some household heads lack the status or skills to 
recruit and manage labour from the extended family or to organise reciprocal 
labour groups.  Without the managerial ability to organise the large cooperative 
labour groups necessary for dry bean production, some farmers may be limited 
to selling wet bean. 
 
Understanding why some households are unwilling or unable to overcome 
labour shortages and how labour availability influences a household’s cocoa 
harvesting strategy (wet bean or dry bean) requires further attention in cocoa 
research.  In other commodity crop industries, such as oil palm, labour 
shortages were found to be a key constraint on productivity, especially on the 
highly populated oil palm Land Settlement Schemes, where disputes over the 
payment of labour can lead to sons and wives withdrawing their labour (see 
Koczberski et al., 2001; Curry & Koczberski, 2004).   
 
Block Condition and Crop Accessibility 
An adequate supply of labour may not be sufficient by itself to maintain a dry 
bean production strategy.  There is considerable evidence to suggest that other 
factors such as the age of a stand of cocoa trees, block condition and degree of 
accessibility for harvesting are important influences on household production 
strategies.  These three factors affect the quantity of ripe accessible fruit, which 
in turn influences strategies of cocoa production.  A plentiful supply of ripe 
crop is more likely to induce smallholders to engage in dry bean production, 
whereas harvesting cocoa for wet bean sales occurs when there are few ripe 
pods accessible for harvesting.  Low crop availability can be associated with 
non-flush periods or old and overgrown blocks where yields are lower, access is 
difficult and high pest and disease levels reduce the number of healthy pods for 
harvesting.   
 
Dry bean producers tend to have younger, more productive blocks, while wet 
bean sellers tend to have older stands of cocoa with high levels of pests and 
diseases.  In the Kokopo-Vunamami LLG villages, where most wet bean selling 
households reside, the median year of planting cocoa stands was 1991 
compared with 1995 in the Livuan-Reimbar LLG where dry bean sales are 
more common.  While the data are inconclusive, they suggest the two main 






The age of a block affects the availability of ripe healthy pods in several ways.  
First, some cocoa varieties experience sharp yield declines at about seven or 
eight years of age (see below) which significantly reduces the crop.  Second, as 
discussed in detail in the next chapter, most mature cocoa blocks over 7 years of 
age are characterised by tall and dense growth of cocoa trees under heavy shade 
because of the long-term neglect of pruning and shade control.  Ghodake et al. 
(1995) noted that block management was much poorer in mature cocoa stands 
than in young stands.  Minimal pruning and shade control on older blocks 
exacerbates pest and disease problems by creating a moist micro-climate 
conducive to pest and disease outbreaks.  The combined outcome of these 
factors is smaller quantities of ripe healthy pods available for harvesting.   
 
The modern varieties of cocoa such as the SG2 hybrids and hybrid clones, 
while being very high yielding in their early years, experience dramatic yield 
declines at a relatively young age.  CCRI research indicated that the hybrids 
“show a considerable yield decline after five to six years” (CCRI, 1999 p.44).  
More recent CCI research also reported significant yield declines in some 
hybrid clones (CCI, 2004) (Figure 6.3).  This is in marked contrast to the results 
of some of the Trinitario trials in the 1950s and 1960s at LAES which reported 
mean annual yields of dry bean of over 927 kg/ha in cocoa trees of 10 to 17 
years of age (Powell, 1991).  Although the Trinitario were not nearly as high 
yielding as the modern varieties in their early years, they had much greater 
longevity and yield consistency over a longer period (Figure 6.4).  In short, they 
had several characteristics that might make them suitable to the low input 
smallholder production strategy.   
 
The marked yield decline of the modern cocoa varieties at five to six years old, 
combined with minimal pruning and shade control measures, means that cocoa 
stands become overgrown at around the same time that yield decline sets in, 
exacerbating the problem of low crop availability.  The low density of easily 
accessible ripe pods is a disincentive to work in the block, and the returns to 
labour are considered insufficient to warrant the mobilisation of family labour 
groups for harvesting.  At this stage only small wet bean harvests are carried 
out in short forays into the block by individual harvesters, usually women.  
Little or no labour is expended on block management.  It seems that 
smallholders adjust harvesting and farm management inputs in response to the 
























HC1-S Clone HC1-B Clone  
Figure 6.3. Average dry bean yield distribution of the HC1-B and HC1-S 






















Figure 6.4. Average dry bean yield of Trinitario trials from 1958/59 to 1965/66 





Although other variables, such as labour supply, price and access to a 
fermentary are important for explaining smallholder harvesting strategies, the 
quantity of accessible healthy ripe pods is critically important and must be 
above some minimum threshold quantity for smallholders to invest time and 
labour in their cocoa blocks.  If the quantity of ripe pods falls below this 
threshold level, smallholders will switch to strategies of lower labour inputs and 
will not invest labour in grass slashing.  On the other hand, when the quantity of 
healthy ripe crop is above this threshold level (e.g., during flush periods or on 
high-yielding younger blocks), growers are motivated to spend more time on 
their blocks, both grass slashing and harvesting for dry bean production.  
Indeed, farmers with both young and old cocoa blocks invest more harvesting 
and maintenance labour in their higher producing younger blocks where access 
is easier and where pest and disease levels are lower.   
 
This crop ‘quantity threshold’ works in a similar way to the more widely 
recognised ‘commodity price threshold’ for PNG smallholders.  Several 
smallholder studies in PNG have argued that production levels, block 
maintenance levels and general interest in cocoa are related to price (e.g., 
Godyn, 1974; George, 1994; Ghodake et al., 1995; Omuru et al., 2001).  While 
price is undoubtedly important, our observations lead us to conclude that the 
quantity of accessible crop is a more important factor over a wide price range.  
In other words, the labour response to variations in the quantity of ripe healthy 
pods available for harvesting is more elastic than the labour supply response to 
cocoa prices5.  The same is true in the oil palm smallholder sector (Curry et. al., 
2005).  The condition of the block and the availability of ripe pods have more 
influence on smallholders’ harvesting and production strategies than price. 
 
The variations in labour supply associated with the condition of the cocoa block 
have their parallels in labour strategies in subsistence food production.  For 
instance, on the Gazelle Peninsula, and in many other areas of PNG, 
subsistence food gardens are cultivated intensively for up to three years with 
considerable labour inputs for clearing and preparing the site, the planting of 
food crops, weeding and harvesting, after which the garden enters a low labour 
input phase until its abandonment to the fallow.  Typically, as food gardens in 
the Gazelle Peninsula move through the cultivation cycle, labour inputs and 
management techniques change. Crop diversity decreases with the age of the 
garden, and perennial staples such as bananas (Musa spp), Singapore taro 
(Xanthosoma sagittifolium), sugar cane (Saccharum spp), and pitpit 
(Saccharum edule) are planted during the later phases of the garden cycle, after 




pumpkin (Bourke, 1976; Ghodake et al., 1995).  As the garden enters the fallow 
phase some perennials such as taro and banana continue to be harvested, but 
labour inputs are very low.  Visits to the garden become less frequent, and are 
usually made by women.   
 
Similarly, in the Wosera area in the East Sepik Province food gardens are 
cultivated intensively for two to three years with considerable labour inputs 
involving the mobilisation of extended family groups for the clearing and firing 
of the bush, the planting of food crops, weeding and harvesting6.  Typically, in 
these areas one or two crops of yams (Dioscorea esculenta) are followed with a 
sweet potato crop.  Then in the third or fourth year, pitpit (Saccharum edule) 
cuttings are planted which marks the end of the planting cycle and the garden 
reverts to fallow.  The garden continues to produce foods such as pitpit, 
bananas and pawpaw for several more years, until the fallow eventually takes 
over.  With the planting of pitpit there is very little further maintenance work in 
the garden.  Like old and overgrown cocoa blocks, visits to these older gardens 
are infrequent, and the brief harvesting visits are largely undertaken by women 
working alone.  By this stage, men have redirected their labour to their younger, 
more productive gardens. 
 
These examples suggest that the way people assess how much labour to commit 
to subsistence production has parallels with decision-making regarding the 
allocation of labour to cocoa production and the type of harvesting strategy 
employed (wet bean versus dry bean production).  Declining yields of garden 
crops relative to labour inputs (due to the exhaustion of soil nutrients after a few 
years of cropping and the build up of weeds from the growing seed bank in the 
soil) initiates an incremental withdrawal of labour from garden maintenance 
and less frequent visits to the garden.  The cultivation stage is replaced by a 
bush-foraging stage in which individual women intermittently visit the old 
garden to forage for foods in the fallow.  In the case of cocoa, when a block 
reaches low productivity levels and does not meet the threshold quantity of 
accessible healthy ripe pods, labour inputs decline significantly.  While the 
returns to labour may not be high enough to interest many men at this low 
productive stage, women still consider it worthwhile to harvest wet bean to earn 
small amounts of money (kwik moni) for immediate purchases, but they expend 
little labour in the process.   
 
 
Whilst access to processing facilities is an important factor explaining why 




strategies, access to labour and the quantity and accessibility of ripe fruit are all 
important determinants.  The low density of ripe and easily accessible fruit of 
older and poorly maintained blocks reduces incentives to invest labour in the 
block, thus making a wet bean strategy more attractive than a dry bean strategy.  
Given the important influence of block condition on a household’s cocoa 
harvesting and labour strategies (i.e. wet or dry bean), the following chapter 





Cocoa Farm Management Practices 
 
This chapter examines cocoa farm management practices and describes some of 
the key features of block management that constrain smallholder productivity1.  
The previous chapter argued that the quantity of healthy ripe pods influences 
the production strategy adopted by smallholders (wet bean or dry bean).  This 
chapter examines how the quantity of healthy ripe pods is reduced by low levels 
of block maintenance.  Poor block maintenance reduces the supply of easily 
accessible crop, which in turn undermines smallholder motivation to invest in 
block maintenance, thereby making a dry bean production strategy less viable.   
 
We begin with an overview of smallholder block management including levels 
of pruning, shade control and weeding.  This is followed by a discussion of pest 
and disease management and harvesting levels in which emphasis is given to 
the relationships amongst pruning and shade control, pest and disease levels, 
and growers’ motivation to produce cocoa.  The chapter also includes a 
discussion of some of the reasons for low labour inputs in block maintenance, 
such as inadequate levels of extension training and shortages of tools.  These 
are not the full explanation, as the rest of the chapter makes clear.   
 
 Block Maintenance 
A typical feature of most smallholder cocoa blocks surveyed was the very low 
levels of block maintenance, especially blocks more than eight or nine years 
old.  In general, block maintenance was characterised by: 
∑ Virtually no pruning of cocoa trees. 
∑ Little or no shade control. 
∑ Near adequate levels of weed control on relatively high producing 
younger blocks during cocoa flush periods. 
∑ An absence of pest and disease control measures.   
∑ Relatively high levels of under-harvesting. 
 
Pruning, Shade Control and Weeding 
Overall, there is minimal pruning of cocoa trees and very little shade control.  
There is usually some formation pruning of immature cocoa, but often this does 
not follow recommended procedures, suggesting that growers have not been 
trained in the correct techniques of pruning.  Thereafter, pruning, if undertaken 




occur at the beginning of the flush period to enable easier access for harvesting.  
The time allocation studies revealed no pruning of cocoa trees and very little 
mangement of shade.  Only two growers, on one occasion each, reported 
managing their shade trees.  Both these growers had young stands of cocoa.  
Young cocoa stands are often inter-planted with food crops, and shade control 
is more likely to be carried out to promote food crop growth rather than cocoa 
production.  Beyond the first two to three years of the establishment of a cocoa 
block, almost no labour is committed to pruning or shade control. 
 
Like pruning, most weeding occurs when the cocoa block is young.  Grass 
slashing is carried out regularly on newly planted cocoa blocks for two main 
reasons.  First, most newly established cocoa blocks are interplanted with food 
crops and weeding is undertaken as part of general food garden maintenance.  
Second, most growers recognise that young cocoa trees are vulnerable to being 
over-shaded or choked by weeds and grasses when they are under 1.5 m tall2.  
Whilst smallholders regularly slash undergrowth on newly planted blocks to 
enable young trees to become established, later grass slashing is largely at the 
beginning of cocoa flush periods to improve access for harvesting.   
 
Our findings regarding pruning and weeding were reinforced by results from an 
assessment of 98 cocoa blocks at Tabaule and Vunalaiting villages in the 
Livuan-Reimbar LLG area in December 2004 and January 2005 which revealed 
very low levels of block maintenance.  While almost half of sample blocks were 
weeded (grass slashing) adequately or better, a substantial proportion were less 
than adequately pruned (76%) or managed for shade (72%) (Figure 7.1).  The 
farm assessments found that most mature cocoa blocks (> 7 years of age) were 
characterised by tall and dense growth of cocoa trees with interlocking 
branches.  These mature blocks were heavily shaded because of the long-term 
neglect of shade control. 
 
Inadequate pruning of cocoa trees and lack of shade control leads to 
substantially reduced yields.  Pruning of cocoa trees is known to stimulate 
flower development hence the potential yield is reduced by the lack of pruning.  
Excessive shade creates favourable conditions for pests and diseases leading to 
the early onset of yield decline.  As Ghodake et al. point out: 
 
Cocoa is a management-intensive crop.  Neglect often results in 
irreparable damage and premature senility or death of the trees 
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Weeding Pruning Shade control  
Figure 7.1. Levels of cocoa block maintenance in Tabaule and Vunalaiting 
villages.  
 
Or as one former extension officer said more prosaically “cocoa is like a sick 
baby… it requires a lot of attention and care, otherwise it will die” (O. Putkin, 
pers. comm., 2004). 
 
The assessment of cocoa block management distinguished between ‘on-block’ 
residence (cocoa blocks planted next to or near growers’ houses) and ‘off-
block’ residence (cocoa blocks at a distance from growers’ homes).  It was 
anticipated that on-block residence would be associated with better block 
maintenance because growers would have more opportunities to work on cocoa 
blocks close to their houses.  Levels of pruning and shade control were not 
strongly associated with on-block residence.  Pruning levels were worse on 
blocks where growers resided, with pruning on 77% of blocks rated as ‘poor’, 
‘very poor’ or ‘none’, compared with 73% of cocoa blocks at a distance from 










The difference was attributable to the older age of cocoa stands near to where 
growers live (mean difference in age of blocks is 3.6 years): the oldest blocks 
were planted closer to growers’ homes, while more recently planted cocoa 






















On-block Off-block  
Figure 7.2. Cocoa pruning standards for on-block and off-block grower 
residence in Tabaule and Vunalaiting villages.   
 
While on-block and off-block differences were not marked for shade control, 
cocoa blocks at a distance from growers’ residences had, as would be 
anticipated, lower standards of shade control than blocks where growers 
resided.  Seventy-five per cent of cocoa stands with off-block residence rated 
‘poor’, ‘very poor’ or ‘none’ for shade control compared with 67% of blocks 
with on-block residence (Figure 7.3).  The better shade management on cocoa 
stands with on-block residence may be to let more light through to highly 
valued fruit trees, kitchen gardens or simply to create a more congenial 
environment (more light and less mosquitoes) around the house site.  Shade 
management was not undertaken specifically to improve cocoa production.   
 
Whilst on-block residence was not strongly associated with pruning and shade 
control — because of very low levels of pruning and shade control overall — 
























On-block Off-block  
Figure 7.3. Shade control standards for on-block and off-block grower 
residence in Tabaule and Vunalaiting villages. 
 
For weeding, 56% of cocoa blocks with on-block residence were rated as 
‘adequate’ compared with 38% of cocoa stands with off-block residence 
(Figure 7.4).  While on-block residence provides more frequent opportunities to 
weed, there is also the ‘pride’ factor, in that people who have tall and unkempt 
grasses or weeds in the vicinity of their homes are considered lazy.  Keeping the 
areas around houses clear of weeds and grasses is socially responsible 
behaviour because it reduces levels of mosquitoes, and makes for a safer living 
environment (less snakes and dangerous insects like centipedes).  While the 
pride factor motivating weeding is perhaps less strong for blocks further away 
from the house, these more distant stands, if the trees are not too tall and 
overgrown, may be weeded at the beginning of the cocoa flush period.  As 
stated previously, this is not for reasons of block sanitation or for more 
























On-block Off-block  
Figure 7.4. Weed control standards for on-block and off-block grower residence 
in Tabaule and Vunalaiting villages. 
 
Pest and Disease Control 
Our assessments indicated that pest and disease management practices were 
minimal (Figure 7.5).  Management of pests and diseases was rated as ‘poor’ or 
‘very poor’ for 80% of blocks, and none had undertaken spraying.  Further, 
whether or not growers resided on their cocoa blocks appeared to have little 
influence on levels of pest and disease control (Figures 7.6 and 7.7), though off-
block residence was associated with marginally better levels of control.  It must 
be remembered that while age differences in cocoa stands may explain the 
slightly better standards of pest and disease control on cocoa blocks with off-
block residence, overall levels of pest and disease control were very low, 
irrespective of whether growers lived on or off their blocks.  
 
Low levels of pest and disease control were also evident in the weekly surveys.  
Some growers said they removed black pods from the branches during 
harvesting and the diseased pods were left where they fell on the ground.  Only 
one grower reported visiting his block specifically to remove diseased pods.  
Another grower recalled using a technique whereby leaves from a certain tree 
were heaped and set alight under a cocoa tree infected with Black Pod.  He 
believed the smoke would ‘kill’ the sickness affecting the pods.  None of the 
households had used chemical sprays for pest control.  These findings concur 




recommended control measures are rarely applied to manage cocoa pests and 
diseases (e.g., Nicholls, 1989; Yarbro & Noble, 1989; George, 1994; Ghodake 












None or Very Poor Poor Adequate Good Very Good









Pests Diseases  




















On-block Off-block  
Figure 7.6. Control standards for cocoa pests for on-block and off-block grower 

























On-block Off-block  
Figure 7.7. Control standards for cocoa diseases for on-block and off-block 
grower residence in Tabaule and Vunalaiting villages. 
 
Despite the low levels of pest and disease control measures, there was 
widespread recognition amongst smallholders of the extent of losses caused by 
pests and diseases like Black Pod and Canker.  Fifteen per cent of cocoa 
farmers in the socio-economic survey cited pest and disease losses as one of the 
key reasons for a contraction of their cocoa holdings over the past five years, 
and 33% of growers identified pest and disease problems as the chief constraint 
on production.  Similarly, Omuru et al. (2001) reported 82% and 73% of ENB 
farmers identified cocoa pests and diseases respectively as the most important 
factors limiting cocoa production.  This issue is explored further in Chapter 8 in 
relation to houeshold labour strategies. 
 
Pest and Disease Rates 
The low levels of block maintenance together with minimal pest and disease 
management were reflected in the high rates of pests and diseases recorded in 
the cocoa block assessments (Figure 7.8).  Two major diseases of cocoa in PNG 
— Vascular Streak Disease (VSD) and Canker — were common, with only 8% 
and 26% of trees respectively being free of these diseases (Pink Disease was 





















VSD Canker  
Figure 7.8. Degree of intensity of infestations of Vascular Streak Disease and 
Canker in Tabaule and Vunalaiting villages. 
 
On-block residence was associated with lower rates of Canker and VSD (Figure 
7.9), particularly canker.  The lower Canker rate was probably attributable to 
the higher rate of weed slashing around house sites (see Figure 7.4).  Canker 
often affects the lower trunk of the tree where borers such as the cocoa weevil 
borer (Pantorhytes biplagiatus) and Longicorn larvae burrow under the bark 
allowing the Canker fungus to enter the tree.  These borers can also ringbark the 
tree (Plate 7.1).  The higher rates of weeding keep the trunk free of grasses, thus 
reducing cover for Pantorhytes weevils and Longicorn beetles.  Slashing also 
























On-block Off-block  
Figure 7.9.  Canker and VSD infection rates for cocoa on-block and off-block 








The lower rate of VSD associated with on-block residence is more difficult to 
explain.  It may reflect slightly better block sanitation associated with the 
higher grass slashing rates, or it may simply reflect people spending more time 
on cocoa blocks nearer to where they reside.  The symptoms of VSD are very 
visible3 and some growers may remove infected branches if they recognise it as 
a potential problem.  Blocks further away from growers’ houses are typically 
only visited for harvesting, and there are fewer opportunities to remove infected 
branches.  
 
Rates of Phytophthora infected pods (Black Pod) were relatively low at 6% of 
the total number of full size pods4 (Table 7.1).  Cocoa blocks with on-block 
residence had marginally higher rates of Phytophthora infected pods than off-
block residence cocoa blocks.  One might expect on-block residence to be 
associated with reduced incidence of diseased pods because of higher levels of 
overall care and maintenance for the cocoa blocks where growers live.  It is 
probable that weeding and grass slashing are greater on cocoa blocks where 
growers reside (e.g., weeding and grass slashing) (see Figure 7.4).  However, 
the effect of increased and more regular inputs of labour is likely to be masked 
by the age difference between the two groups of blocks.  Cocoa stands near 
farmers’ houses were on average 3.6 years older than cocoa stands at a distance 
from growers’ residences.  The marginally higher rates of Phytophthora 
infected pods on cocoa blocks with on-block residence may be explained by the 
greater age of these cocoa stands, giving a longer period for the build-up of 
inoculant.  Moreover, the non-removal of infected pods from cocoa trees 
together with high rates of under-harvesting (see below), enlarges the reservoir 
of disease inoculant thereby sustaining high infection rates (Plate 7.2).   
 
Table 7.1. Percentages of mature pods identified as Black Pod (Phytophthora), 
Dry Pod and Healthy Pods by location of growers’ residence.  
House Location Black Pod 
(Phytophthora) 
Dry Pod Healthy Pod 
On-block 
 
6.0 30.5 63.5 
Off-block 
 
4.6 26.1 69.3 
All blocks 
 






Plate 7.2.  Symptoms of Black Pod (Phytophthora) infected 
pods on a smallholder block.  This infected pod was at waist 
height in the tree and next to the main track to the grower’s 
house.  Only a small minority of growers remove infected 
pods.  
 
Finally, long-term minimal pruning and shade control on older blocks 
exacerbates pest and disease problems by creating a moist micro-climate 
conducive to outbreaks of Black Pod and other pests and diseases (Konam, 
1999).  Any spatial effect of increased pest and disease rates on more distant 
cocoa blocks is masked by the greater age of cocoa stands on blocks where 
growers reside.  The influence of the age of the cocoa stand on block 
maintenance standards (e.g., pruning and shade control) and pest and disease 
rates was also noted by Ghodake et al. (1995) on the Gazelle Peninsula.  The 
authors found that 80% and 69% of Phytophthora and VSD infestations, 
respectively, were located in ‘mature cocoa’ where block management 
conditions were much poorer than in younger cocoa stands. 
 
Harvesting Rates 
While production losses due to pests and diseases are important factors 
explaining low productivity, another major factor is under-harvesting, 
particularly on older cocoa blocks.  Dry pods are evidence of under-harvesting 
in the previous four month period.  When ripe pods are not harvested they dry 
out and can remain for up to 18 weeks on the tree before disintegrating (J. 




Despite the possibility that some Black Pods were incorrectly identified as dry 
pod4 during the survey, under-harvesting is clearly a significant problem.  Dry 
pods made up 29% of the total number of full size pods on the trees sampled.  
The rate was slightly higher for on-block residence, reflecting the greater age 
and height of these trees which makes harvesting more difficult (Table 7.1).  
There was also evidence of an edge-effect in which the ratio of dry pods to 
mature healthy pods increased from 24% of total full size pods at the roadside 
edge of the block (or from the family home on the block) to around 34% at 40 
m to 50 m into the block5.  While the height in the tree of dry pods was not 
noted in the survey, observations indicated that dry pods were more common in 
the upper canopy where harvesting is more difficult and time-consuming, 
thereby implicating labour supply constraints in its incidence and distribution.  
The high levels of under-harvesting represent a considerable loss of smallholder 
production and income.  Moreover, the high levels of under-harvesting of 
mature pods in the upper canopy increase the likelihood of disease in the cocoa 
block.   
 
 Explaining Low Levels of Block Maintenance 
High rates of pests and diseases severely reduce smallholder productivity and 
incomes (Ghodake et al., 1995; Drenth & Sendall, 2004).  High rates of pests 
and disease (and the consequent low yields) are themselves an outcome of very 
low levels of labour invested in block maintenance.  The question remains as to 
why most smallholders do not undertake even basic pruning and shade control?  
The answer lies in a combination of factors including limited knowledge of 
appropriate farm management practices, few or inappropriate tools for block 
maintenance and harvesting, and the vegetation structure of the block (a 
function of the age of the block and shade level) which affects accessibility for 
harvesting and the supply of labour for all of these tasks.   
 
The following discussion considers the role of tools and agricultural extension 
and training in smallholder management practices.  In the next chapter we 
examine how the developmental stage of a cocoa stand influences how family 
labour is deployed in cocoa production. 
 
Farm Tools  
A shortage of tools is almost certainly a contributing factor to low levels of 
block maintenance.  Figure 7.10 compares household ownership of tools on the 
Gazelle Peninsula with households in three villages near the Stockholm 




partnership with cocoa smallholders to raise their productivity and incomes.  
NGIP-Newmark is providing smallholders with extension training, hybrid 
cocoa seedlings and clones, and tools on credit.  These smallholders are 
amongst the highest producing smallholder cocoa growers in PNG (G. 






















Bailu & Tabaule Stockholm  
Figure 7.10. Rates of ownership of tools amongst village households in 
Kokopo-Vunamami and Livuan-Reimbar LLG areas compared with village 
households near the Stockholm plantation group in the Bainings, ENB.    
 
Smallholders on the Gazelle Peninsula and at Stockholm have similar rates of 
ownership for some tools, such as harvesting knives (hook knives) and 
wheelbarrows.  But households on the Gazelle Peninsula have fewer tools for 
block maintenance, particularly for pruning and shade control (e.g. secateurs, 
pruning saws, and pole pruners for cutting high branches) (Figure 7.10).  On 
some blocks on the Gazelle Peninsula there was visible evidence of damage to 
cocoa trees as a result of bush knives being used to cut branches (to improve 
access for harvesting), thereby raising risks of tree infection. 
 
While almost 90% of households on the Gazelle Peninsula reported possessing 
a cocoa knife for harvesting pods, many harvesters used bush knifes, and some 
harvesters were observed tearing the pods from trees during harvesting (Plates 
7.3 and 7.4).  This damages the cushion on the trunk from which new flowers 




term productive potential of the tree.  When the damaging effects of this 
harvesting practice were pointed out to farmers by extension officers, farmers 
said they were unaware of the potential loss of future production and increased 
risk of infection.   
 
 
Plate 7.3.  Cocoa pod harvested by ripping it from the 




Plate 7.4.  A flower cushion damaged by tearing the 





Tool shortages may have a direct bearing on block condition in several ways.  
First, use of the correct tools will increase labour efficiency.  Second, farmers 
who use the incorrect tools (e.g. bush knives for pruning) risk damaging their 
trees and introducing infections (although any pruning is better than no 
pruning).  Third, adequate pruning and shade control will reduce the incidence 
of pests and diseases and increase yields.  This is important because when the 
availability of accessible, healthy ripe pods increases farmers will increase the 
size of their labour groups for harvesting (e.g. during flush periods) and commit 
more labour to grass slashing.  The effective promotion of tools amongst 
smallholders, together with adequate training in their use, would raise labour 
effectiveness in farm management and lead to improved yields.   
 
Extension Training 
Many smallholders continue to place importance on the role of extension 
training for maintaining good production and perceive a need for more regular 
extension training and advice to improve block management techniques.  Their 
concerns regarding extension are reflected in the following selection of 
smallholder comments noted during the socio-economic survey of farmers in 
the Kokopo-Vunamami and Livuan-Reimbar LLG villages: 
 
[Farmers] need extension workers to advise them on both hybrid cocoa 
and hybrid cocoa clone management. 
 
Extension officers… should teach the farmers [about] cocoa block 
management. 
 
Extension is needed in the rural areas to train especially the youth in 
cocoa work. 
 
The farmer really needs help from the extension officers on pest and 
disease control. 
 
Extension officers should visit farmers in their wards to help farmers in 
pruning or even to manage cocoa blocks. 
 
It will be good to have the extension officers visit us to give advice on 





The inappropriate farm management practices observed during this study also 
confirm that more farmer training is necessary to improve smallholder 
production.  In the study areas only about one third of farmers received 
extension training or advice during the twelve months preceding the study6 
(Table 7.2).   
 
Table 7.2.  Percentages of growers who said they received some extension 










New hybrid clones 39.5 10.0 24.4 
Cocoa redevelopment 44.7 12.5 28.2 
Pruning 44.7 20.0 32.1 
Pest & disease control 34.2 15.0 24.4 
Shade control 42.1 17.5 29.5 
Weed control 44.7 22.5 33.3 
Cocoa management 52.6 20.0 36.3 
* Extension advice included formal or informal training from a government extension worker, 
attendance at a field day or a visit to CCI or another agricultural station  
 
The relatively low level of training and advice on the management of the new 
hybrid clones (Table 7.2) means that the high yield potential of this new clonal 
material may not be realised because they require different management and 
pruning techniques from earlier cocoa material.  The new clones require 
specific pruning techniques when young to ensure high yields when mature.  
For example, CCI recommends tipping at 4-6 months after planting, followed 
by formation pruning at around three months after tipping7.  Light pruning 
should then follow every 3-4 months until the canopy closes.  Without this 
advice, smallholders will undoubtedly apply inappropriate management 
practices to their newly planted hybrid clones.  
 
The experiences of extension officers reveal that providing extension advice 
and training to smallholders does not guarantee that the advice will be 
incorporated into their repertoire of cocoa management practices8.  During this 
study, extension officers often voiced their frustration at providing training to 
farmers only to see a small minority of farmers apply their newly acquired 
skills and techniques.  The problem is compounded by the fact that few growers 
have the appropriate tools to manage their blocks effectively.  In addition, 
despite the recognition among smallholders of the debilitating effects of pests 




While efforts to increase agricultural extension and training would undoubtedly 
raise smallholder productivity it would be unrealistic to expect that such efforts 
on their own will solve the problem of low smallholder productivity.  This is 
firstly because of the low uptake of advice and secondly because of a set of 
complex factors that lead to underharvesting and low levels of investment in 
block maintenance.  These factors include: 
∑ the amount of ripe accessible fruit available for harvesting; 
∑ labour shortages and the under-utilisation of available labour; 
∑ the relative importance of cocoa income to other sources of household 
income; 
∑ whether a household is predominantly a wet bean or dry bean seller; 
∑ the distribution of cocoa income within the family; 
∑ the practice among some growers of planting new areas of cocoa rather 
than investing time and labour in rehabilitating their unproductive older 
cocoa blocks; 
∑ high levels of pests and diseases; 
∑ high rates of under-harvesting; 
∑ shortages of tools; 
∑ the development stage of the cocoa block. 
 
The next chapter brings these factors together in a simple model of production 
that illustrates how these factors work together to influence smallholder 






A Model of Smallholder Production 
 
The last three chapters revealed that smallholder cocoa production strategies are 
determined by a complex set of interconnected factors encompassing household 
livelihood strategies, the distribution of household income, labour supply, pests 
and diseases and block condition.  Smallholders identified the top four 
constraints on cocoa production in declining order of importance as:  
∑ theft of cocoa pods (sometimes an indication of under-harvesting); 
∑ poor block condition (overgrown cocoa trees, over-shading and high 
levels of pests and diseases); 
∑ labour shortages; and 
∑ poor knowledge of proper management practices, especially regarding 
new hybrid cocoa clones. 
 
This chapter explores the inter-relationships among livelihood strategies, 
household income distribution, labour supply and block condition using a 
simple model that relates the key characteristics of smallholder production to 
the three different development stages of the typical smallholder cocoa block.  
The model of smallholder production presented here highlights the relationships 
between the age of a cocoa block (and hence its vegetational structure), pest and 
disease levels, yields, household labour inputs and production strategies.  It 
provides a conceptual framework for understanding smallholder productivity 
that can be used to develop interventions in partnership with smallholders to 
raise productivity and incomes.  Policy interventions are discussed in Chapter 9. 
 
Model of Smallholder Production 
The model of smallholder production depicted in Figures 8.1a to 8.1f, reveals 
that the age of a cocoa block is a key determinant of block condition including 
vegetation structure, degree of shading and levels of infestations with pests and 
diseases.  Because the typical smallholder cocoa block receives little or no 
pruning and shade control, and there is virtually no management of pests and 
diseases, the condition of a block is largely a function of its age.  Further, the 
deteriorating condition of the block with age means that under-harvesting can 
become a significant problem on older cocoa blocks.  The age of a cocoa stand 
influences labour inputs through the particular harvesting/production strategies 





The model is based on three development stages of the cocoa block: immature; 
mature; and, senile (Figure 8.1a).  Each stage has associated with it a distinctive 
set of structural characteristics of the vegetation: 
∑ Stage 1 Immature: < 3 years (low production and low pest and disease 
levels). 
∑ Stage 2 Mature: 3-8 years (high production and rising pest and disease 
levels). 
∑ Stage 3 Senile: 7-8 + years (low production and high pest and disease 
levels). 
 
Each development stage also has its own distinct characteristics in terms of the 
following:  
1. levels of pests and diseases (Figure 8.1b);  
2. labour inputs (Figure 8.1c); 
3. the degree of accessibility for harvesting (Figure 8.1d); 
4. the quantity of healthy, ripe crop available for harvesting (Figure 8.1d);  
5. harvesting and production strategies employed by smallholders (wet or 
dry bean production) (Figures 8.1e and Figure 8.1f).   
 
The three development stages of a cocoa block may vary by cocoa variety and 
the timing of the transition between stages.  They can also be modified by a 
range of other production factors such as labour shortages (see Chapter 6), 
climate variability (poor flush period) or access to or disputes over land 
(Chapter 4).  Each stage is discussed below. 
 
Stage 1 Immature 
In the young cocoa stand, there is open space between the trees and they are not 
overshaded by the most commonly planted shade tree, Gliricidia.  Most of the 
crop is harvested because of easy accessibility (open space between trees and 
short trees) and a high proportion of ripe pods are disease free.  The small 
number of cocoa pods per tree usually means the crop is sold as wet bean.  
These small wet bean harvests are usually carried out by one or two individual 
family members working alone or together.  As shown in Table 6.2 (Chapter 6), 
most wet bean harvesting is undertaken by women and children.  Although dry 
bean production is less common on Stage 1 blocks, some growers with large 
holdings of Stage 1 cocoa or access to an additional cocoa holding with 
relatively good yields (e.g., a Stage 2 cocoa block), may harvest sufficient 

























Figure 8.1e. Labour input and harvesting strategy profile associated with the 
three stage model of smallholder production.   
 
 
Figure 8.1f. Farming and foraging phases associated with the three stage model 




Cocoa stands at Stage 1 show promising potential for future production and 
income levels because they are more likely to be the latest planting material 
distributed by CCI.  During Stage 1, production is rising as the trees mature, 
and growers show an interest in grass cutting.  While many farmers recognise 
that young cocoa trees are easily choked by weeds and grasses and therefore 
must be weeded regularly, the onset of pod development and harvesting 
encourages farmers to invest more time and labour in these blocks.  As CCI’s 
on-farm trials have revealed, farmers managing precocious hybrid clones that 
bear fruit at 18 months commence block maintenance (grass slashing) earlier 
and visit their blocks more regularly than farmers managing later fruiting 
hybrids (David Yinil, CCI, pers. comm., November, 2004).   
 
Furthermore, because most growers interplant young cocoa with food crops 
such as bananas, cassava, peanuts, or other fruit trees, the cocoa block is visited 
more frequently than older blocks where the shade canopy precludes cultivation 
of food crops.  The practice of intercropping cocoa with food crops was 
observed on the Gazelle Peninsula as early as 1976 by Bourke who noted “[t]he 
farming systems have been modified so that food crop production can be 
phased into cash cropping, particularly with cocoa” (p. 96).  Ghodake et al. 
(1995) also found that the majority of recently planted cocoa blocks surveyed in 
their study on the Gazelle Peninsula were hybrid cocoa interplanted with food 
crops.  They also reported that block management was “fair to very good” on 
81% of these blocks (p. 60), although inadequate shade control was a problem 
on most blocks. 
 
Both the planting of early producing cocoa varieties and the interplanting of 
young cocoa with food crops encourages growers to visit their Stage 1 blocks 
more frequently and perform maintenance like weeding.  Because the cocoa 
income from Stage 1 blocks is low (but rising), these growers depend on 
alternative income sources such as other cash crops or the income earned at 
local markets by female members of the household.  As yields of cocoa rise, the 
family’s dependence on other income sources diminishes and cocoa becomes 
the focus of cash earning activities.  At this stage, farmers show interest in their 
block and anticipate good future returns from their labour. 
 
Stage 2 Mature 
During the mature, productive stage (3-8 years) the trees are larger, but not so 
tall that harvesting the upper branches is difficult.  There is still open space 
between the trees, making for relatively unimpeded access for harvesting, and 




Because the block is not overgrown nor too heavily shaded, pest and disease 
levels are tolerable and not yet affecting crop yields significantly (Figure 8.1b).  
Relatively high crop yields continue to encourage growers to slash weeds and 
grasses to improve access for harvesting.  However, pruning, shade 
management, pest and disease control and other tasks necessary for maintaining 
the block in good condition are generally not undertaken.   
 
The large amount of ripe, healthy crop available for harvesting is associated 
with a shift in production strategies.  Households shift from wet bean selling, 
typical of Stage 1, to dry bean processing (Figure 8.1d).  At Stage 2 a high 
proportion of the crop is sold as dry bean, thereby generating better returns for 
smallholders (families without processing facilities are often able to access 
those of relatives).  The larger quantity of crop available for harvesting also 
requires larger harvesting groups, and more men are usually involved in 
harvesting.  Harvesting groups tend to be large family groups of men, women 
and children working together (Table 6.2, Chapter 6).   
 
If the quantity of ripe cocoa available for harvesting is sufficiently large, family 
harvesting groups may be augmented with labour recruited from the extended 
family, and, very occasionally by the employment of hired labour.  Co-
operative work groups made up of the extended family and/or village groups 
often form at the beginning of the cocoa flush to slash undergrowth to improve 
access for harvesting.  Sometimes these co-operative work groups operate as 
reciprocal labour groups (varvarmal), where each nuclear family’s cocoa block 
is cleared of undergrowth in turn by the co-operative group (see Chapter 6).  
Hired labour may be employed for grass slashing, but this tends to be limited to 
those farmers with a more business-focused approach to cocoa production, and 
this type of grower is in a minority.   
 
While most of the crop is processed and sold as dry bean, small amounts of wet 
bean may continue to be sold.  Many women, although participating in family 
harvesting for dry bean production in Stage 2, continue to harvest and sell small 
quantities of wet bean.  These small sales of wet bean supplement women’s 
income from local markets, with the income spent immediately on basic 
household items such as store foods. 
 
The more cooperative household labour strategies associated with Stage 2 
cocoa blocks (and dry bean production generally) rely on the skills of the male 
household head to recruit and manage family labour (Chapter 6).  A common 




for the male household head (the father) to allocate harvest rounds, usually 
during flush periods, to co-resident married sons or daughters, or to relatives 
needing cash2.  The individual allocated the harvest round will recruit and 
manage the necessary labour and take responsibility for processing and 
marketing the cocoa, and distributing the income.   
 
By allocating harvest rounds to immediate family and other relatives, the father 
ensures the supply of labour for harvesting (and often grass slashing) is 
adequate for maintaining high harvesting rates during Stage 2 production.  The 
allocation of harvest rounds creates an obligation amongst those granted harvest 
rounds to reciprocate by providing labour for cocoa and subsistence tasks.  
Also, because of the high density and easy accessibility of healthy, ripe pods 
during cocoa flushes in Stage 2 blocks, labour recruitment is easier than for 
older, Stage 3 blocks. Some household heads lack the status or skills to manage 
reciprocal labour arrangements, and therefore find it difficult to shift from wet 
bean sales (associated with Stage 1) to the Stage 2 dry bean production strategy 
that requires larger work groups.   
 
Stage 2 cocoa blocks can return relatively good incomes to smallholders.  
During flush periods, cocoa is likely to be the dominant household economic 
activity and source of income.  But while income levels are relatively high, very 
little of that income is reinvested in block maintenance (Chapter 5, see also 
Omuru et al., 2001).  Further, because of the absence of pruning and shade 
control, the increased flowering rate in response to effective pruning and shade 
control does not occur.  Towards the later years of Stage 2, pest and disease 
levels begin to rise sharply, leading to falling yields.  As the blocks become 
overgrown, accessibility declines, and it becomes progressively more difficult 
to harvest.  Farmers begin to lose interest in their cocoa block 
 
Stage 3 Senile 
Stage 3 (>7-8 years) is the least productive stage in the life cycle of the cocoa 
block.  At this stage, the vegetation is dense and the block is overgrown (Figure 
8.1a).  There is no open space between the cocoa trees because the branches 
interlock those of neighbouring trees, and the shade cover is dense.  Block 
maintenance is virtually abandoned.  The amount of healthy ripe crop that is 
easily accessible for harvesting falls to very low levels because of the high 
proportion of diseased pods and the difficulty of harvesting pods in the dense 
vegetation or high in the canopy.  Incentives to invest labour in block 





When a cocoa stand enters Stage 3, income from the block declines rapidly to 
low levels, and dry bean production ceases (Figure 8.1d).  Cooperative 
household work groups are disbanded and production strategies revert to those 
similar to Stage 1 development, that is, very small quantities of cocoa harvested 
by women working alone or with young children.  During Stage 3, the small 
quantities of cocoa harvested are sold as wet bean and production is driven by 
short-term needs.  Typically, families use their Stage 3 cocoa blocks like bank 
ATMs: the cocoa block is visited only when cash is required for immediate 
consumption (e.g., church donations or small store purchases such as soap, 
kerosene, or food for the evening meal).  Growers call this type of income ‘kwik 
moni’ because the income is earned quickly and with little effort.  Block visits 
rarely involve more than a few hours of harvesting during which time one or 
two baskets of wet beans are collected and sold (average harvest 17.7 kg — see 
Table 6.2).  Very little or no time is allocated to block maintenance (Figure 
8.1e).  This type of production practice is known as ‘forage harvesting’.  Male 
farmers have lost almost all interest in their cocoa block as it enters the Stage 3 
senile phase.   
 
Associated with the transition to a Stage 3 cocoa block is the diversion of 
family labour to more lucrative income sources, such as to the family’s younger 
and healthier cocoa holdings, to other cash crops, or to increased production of 
food, tobacco or betel nut for sale at local markets to compensate for the 
declining income from their Stage 3 cocoa holdings.  If the household has 
sufficient land, they are much more likely to establish new cocoa blocks rather 
than replant their old Stage 3 block.  Whilst these old blocks are not generating 
much income (much less than could be achieved by replanting), growers are 
reluctant to replant them because they are still generating some income.  Also, it 
is easier to establish a new block on an existing garden site than rehabilitate or 
replant an old block.  This observation is supported by Ghodake et al. (1995, 
p.58) who reported that several farmers in their study had large tracts of land (at 
least several hectares) planted to cocoa.  The level of farm management among 
these farmers was very low, and the area planted was too large for individual 
households to manage effectively.  Rather than investing their labour in 
managing their existing mature cocoa blocks and increasing the cash returns, 








Farming or Foraging 
The three stages of block development described above in the model of 
smallholder production are associated with two very different harvesting and 
block management practices. In Stages 1 and 2 regular harvesting and some 
block maintenance, essentially grass slashing, is carried out and we label these 
two stages, the ‘farming phase’ of the cocoa block (Figure 8.1f).  In Stage 3, 
block maintenance is abandoned and harvesting is intermittent.  At this stage 
the block has entered a ‘foraging phase’ (Figure 8.1f) where the block is 
visited intermittently in order to ‘forage’ for small quantities of ripe pods.  The 
key differences in cocoa production strategies associated with the farming and 
foraging phases are summarised in Table 8.1. 
 
During the ‘farming phase’ of Stages 1 and 2, the vegetation structure is such 
that the open space between the cocoa trees allows easy access for harvesting.  
Further, because the shade canopy has not yet closed, and the cocoa trees are 
still receiving adequate light, there is good pod development without significant 
losses from pests and diseases (e.g., less Black Pod because of the drier micro-
climate).  Together these factors help sustain growers’ interest in their cocoa 
holdings so that they are motivated to pursue a farming strategy of production.   
 
Without pruning and shade control, the block passes prematurely into Stage 3, 
the old, unproductive foraging phase.  The premature ‘ageing’ of the block 
further reduces the motivation of smallholders to commit labour to block 
maintenance and harvesting, and the cocoa block becomes like any other ‘bush’ 
resource or old abandoned food garden (see Chapter 6).  A downward spiral 
starts in which pest and disease levels rise even further as labour is withdrawn, 
creating more disincentives to invest in block maintenance and harvesting.  The 
interrelationships amongst labour supply, block management, tree productivity 







Table 8.1. Cocoa production strategies for farming (Stages 1-2) and foraging 








Labour inputs in block 
maintenance 
Relatively high labour inputs 
in grass slashing at beginning 
of flush periods. 
Very little or no labour 
inputs in block 
maintenance. 
Harvesting strategy ‘Farming harvesting strategy’ 
used through the year.  
Farmer may revert to 
‘foraging’ during low crop 
non-flush periods. 
‘Foraging harvesting 
strategy’ used throughout 




Processed and sold as dry 
bean.  Some wet bean sales 
during low crop non-flush 
periods. 




Long (>4 hours/day on 
multiple days). 
Short (<4 hours/day). 
Harvest frequency and rates Fortnightly, especially during 




Size of family work group 
engaged in harvesting 
during flush period 
Large (3+ labourers). 
 
Small (<3 labourers). 
Family labourers Men, women and children. Women and children. 
 




Varvarmal work groups. 
 
Some hired labour on a small 
proportion of blocks. 
Nuclear family.  
Purpose of income  Deferred consumption.  Large 
purchases (e.g., school fees, 
house building materials).  
Investment in other business 
such as tradestores or poultry 
coops. 
Immediate consumption. 
Small purchases (e.g., soap, 
kerosene, store foods). 
Control of income  Controlled by household 
head, usually the 
husband/father. 
Controlled by harvester, 
usually individual women. 
Importance of alternative 
income sources 
Low (cocoa is the primary 
income source). 
High (labour often diverted 
to other economic 
activities). 





Whilst a combination of socio-economic factors influences levels of labour 
inputs in cocoa production (Figure 8.2), the main factor appearing to influence 
whether cocoa producers are ‘farmers’ or ‘foragers’ is the quantity of ripe 
healthy crop easily accessible for harvesting.  As argued in Chapter 6, the 
quantity of accessible healthy ripe pods must be above some minimum 
threshold level before smallholders will adopt a ‘farming strategy’.  If the 
quantity of ripe pods falls below this threshold, smallholders switch to a ‘forage 
harvesting strategy’ of very low labour inputs (minimal grass slashing and 
harvesting), and they will begin to invest their labour elsewhere (Figure 8.2).  
At this stage, a smallholder might consider replanting the block, but this tends 
to be deferred indefinitely if there are more productive blocks to harvest or if 
land is available to plant new cocoa stands.  On the Gazelle Peninsula most new 
cocoa stands are established in new garden sites.  In this case, little additional 
labour is required to establish a cocoa block on a newly cleared garden site 



























INADEQUATE BLOCK MANAGEMENT 
 
Partial harvesting 
Low maintenance levels 
POOR BLOCK CONDITION 
 
Unharvested ripe pods 
Heavy or irregular shade 
Tall (old) cocoa trees 
LOW TREE PRODUCTIVITY 
 
Low flowering rates 
Poor pod development 
Increased disease problems 
LOW NUMBER OF RIPE 
HEALTHY PODS FOR 
HARVESTING 
DECLINING 
INVESTMENT IN COCOA 
BLOCK 
 
Less frequent visits to block. 
 
Increase in ‘forage’ 
harvesting strategy (small wet 
bean harvests). 
 
Further decline in weeding. 
 
Redirection of labour to more 
productive cocoa blocks or to 





Large cocoa holdings relative to 
available labour 
 
Limited knowledge of block 
management 
 
Few or inappropriate farm tools 
 





Elderly household head 
 
Livelihood commitments outside 
of cocoa production 
 
Minimal re-investment of cocoa 
income in cocoa holdings 
Figure 8.2. The relationship betw
een labour supply, block 
m
anagem




With the transition to the foraging strategy of Stage 3, the returns to labour are 
lower, although not as low as they would be if smallholders continued to apply 
Stage 2 production strategies to their old, Stage 3 cocoa holdings.  While the 
returns to labour on Stage 3 blocks might not be high enough to interest many 
men, women still consider it worth their while to harvest wet bean for kwik 
moni, but they expend minimal labour in the process.  In other words, given the 
lack of pruning and shade control, Stage 3 foraging strategies are a rational 
production strategy for old and overgrown cocoa blocks.   
 
The reluctance to replant and the long-term acceptance of very low productivity 
associated with Stage 3 cocoa blocks means that many smallholder cocoa 
holdings are in the old unproductive Stage 3 phase for a much longer period 
than the more productive Stage 1 and 2 phases.  Indeed, the evidence presented 
in this study, together with other studies on the Gazelle Peninsula (e.g., 
Ghodake et al., 1995; Kakul, 2006) indicate that old and/or overgrown cocoa 
blocks are the most common type of smallholder cocoa block.  Kakul (2006) 
estimates that 69% of cocoa blocks in Kokopo and Gazelle Districts are aged 11 
years and over, 25% of which are more than 21 years old4.   
 
Modifications of the Model 
The three stage model of smallholder production outlined in this chapter should 
be considered the standard pattern of smallholder production.  The basic model 
can be modified to accommodate a range of other socio-economic factors that 
influence smallholder productivity.  These socio-economic factors are listed in 
the left-hand box of Figure 8.2 and can modify the model in two main ways:  
1. By expanding or contracting the duration of Stage 2 production by 
shifting the boundary to the left or to the right between Stages 2 and 3; 
and, 
2. by shifting upwards or downwards sections of the curves for yields, 
labour inputs and pests and diseases shown in Figures 8.1b and 8.1c.   
 
For example, one or more of the socio-economic factors listed in the left-hand 
box in Figure 8.2 may lead to a reduction in labour inputs thereby causing pest 
and disease levels to rise, which in turn may create further disincentives to 
invest labour in block maintenance and harvesting.  This would lead to a 
contraction of the productive Stage 2 period and a dampening down of the 
curves for yields and labour inputs and a steeper and upward shift in the pest 





One of the most important factors modifying the basic three-stage model of 
smallholder production is labour shortages, both absolute (e.g., small family 
size) and functional.  For example, in less co-operative households where social 
conflicts over work and income distribution are common, functional shortages 
of labour may emerge despite the abundance of ripe, healthy crop available for 
harvesting during Stages 1 and 2.  Family members, particularly the female 
household head or a married, co-resident son, may be unwilling to provide 
harvesting labour because they feel underpaid for their labour (see Chapter 6).  
In these situations, the dry bean production associated with Stage 2 will be 
below potential levels.  Under-harvesting may emerge as a serious problem, 
which may hasten the build up of pest and disease levels as unharvested pods 
become reservoirs for diseases such as Phytophthora.  Thus, the effect of this 
functional labour shortage on the model is to shift the boundary between Stage 
2 and Stage 3 to the left, whereby the block would enter Stage 3 at a younger 
age.  There would also be a dampening down of the curves for yields and labour 
inputs.  In extreme cases where the mobilisation of family labour remains a 
problem for prolonged periods, the block may not enter the dry bean production 
phase usually associated with Stage 2, and the household may continue to rely 
on a wet bean production strategy with relatively small quantities of beans 
harvested by individual family members working alone.   
 
Towards a Synthesis 
Smallholder research spanning over three decades has repeatedly found that 
smallholders invest inadequate amounts of labour and capital in their cocoa 
blocks, especially in pruning and shade management.  The result, as depicted in 
the model of smallholder production, is that most smallholder blocks enter the 
unproductive Stage 3 ‘foraging’ phase prematurely, and this stage dominates 
the life of the cocoa block.  Blocks in poor condition, characteristic of the late 
phase of Stage 2 and of Stage 3, produce fewer ripe healthy pods for harvesting, 
creating disincentives for smallholders to invest time and labour in harvesting 
and block maintenance.  Smallholders have a minimum threshold of accessible, 
healthy ripe pods available for harvesting which influences their production 
strategies.  When yields fall below this minimum threshold, growers adopt a 
wet bean foraging strategy of very low labour inputs and will shift their 
attention and labour to other income activities.   
 
The low labour inputs in cocoa production and the premature transition of a 
cocoa block into the unproductive Stage 3 foraging phase results from a 





∑ Insecure or disputed land tenure. 
∑ Shortages of household labour because of the demographic 
characteristics of households (e.g., elderly households without adult 
children or young families with dependent children) resulting in low 
rates of harvesting and poor block maintenance. 
∑ Functional labour shortages where individual family members are 
reluctant to contribute labour to cocoa production, usually because of 
disputed remuneration of their labour such as under-payment for work 
done on family cocoa plots. 
∑ The labour demands of a diverse range of competing livelihood 
activities.  
∑ The long-term effects of the reluctance of growers to invest labour in 
block maintenance. 
∑ Overgrown and poorly maintained cocoa blocks suffering from high 
rates of pests and diseases, leading to few incentives to invest time, 
labour and finances in cocoa blocks. 
∑ Low density of accessible, ripe pods for harvesting. 
∑ Yield decline of some cocoa varieties after 7 or 8 years of age. 
∑ Limited knowledge of the techniques for block maintenance, especially 
pruning and shade management.  
∑ Minimal extension advice and training due to shortages of funds and 
staffing for extension. 
∑ Shortages of tools for effective block maintenance. 
 
These findings concur with the results of earlier studies (see Chapter 2) which 
also identified poor farm management practices as a primary constraint on 
smallholder production.  As outlined in Chapter 2, previous studies in ENB 
(e.g., Nicholls 1989; Yarbro and Noble, 1989; Ghodake et al., 1995; Lummani 
& Nailina, 2001; Omuru et al., 2001) identified the main constraints on 
smallholder production as: 
∑ Labour shortages. 
∑ Poor agronomic and farm management practices (high pest and disease 
levels). 
∑ Land tenure insecurity. 
∑ Low cocoa prices. 
 
For various reasons smallholders are reluctant to invest labour in block 
maintenance even though the returns on such investments of labour would be 




undertaken by smallholder households.  Smallholder livelihoods are 
increasingly reliant on a range of income sources as people respond to the 
various economic pressures (e.g., rising school fees and store prices) and new 
opportunities (e.g. new markets in vanilla production or non-farm employment) 
in their lives.  By deploying their labour in particular ways (e.g. in wet bean 
sales or dry bean processing) across a range of livelihood activities, overall 
livelihood security and income may be enhanced (e.g., diverse income sources 
versus reliance on a single income source).  However, such diverse livelihood 
strategies may require some sacrifice in cocoa productivity.  Therefore, 
tolerance of high levels of cocoa pests and diseases, and low labour inputs may 
be considered appropriate strategies within an overall set of livelihood 
strategies.   
 
To some extent cocoa competes with other income activities for family labour, 
time and investment capital.  If the cocoa block is not providing sufficient 
income to meet the many cash needs of the family it is likely that family 
members will divert their labour to other, more profitable activities where the 
returns to labour are higher.  This is especially the case when a block enters 
Stage 3 where returns to labour from selling wet bean are low relative to dry 
bean production.   
 
Low harvesting rates and minimal labour inputs in cocoa block management by 
smallholders are therefore not new and many years of extension and training 
have not generated significant improvements in block management or 
smallholder productivity.  Raising smallholder productivity is very difficult, 
and what this and earlier studies have pointed to is the complexity of the issues 
involved: there are no simple solutions.   
 
Developing strategies to overcome the complex and long-standing constraints 
on smallholder productivity, particularly the premature transition of cocoa 
blocks into the unproductive Stage 3 foraging stage, requires innovative 
approaches that accommodate current smallholder farm management practices, 
existing extension efforts, the everyday needs and circumstances of cocoa 
smallholders, and which also create new incentives for smallholders to devote 
more time and labour to cocoa production.  In the final chapter we turn to 
consider extension approaches that move beyond educating smallholders about 
block management to approaches involving partnerships between the 











Strategies for Improving Smallholder Production and Incomes 
 
Drawing on the smallholder model of production discussed in Chapter 8, this 
chapter proposes several strategies to raise smallholder productivity and to 
place the smallholder sector in a more viable position for the future.  There is 
considerable potential on the Gazelle Peninsula, and within Papua New Guinea 
generally, to increase smallholder production and strengthen smallholders’ role 
in export production without expanding the area of cocoa under cultivation.  
The strategies outlined below give priority to increasing productivity from 
existing cocoa holdings by addressing the main constraints on production.  
These strategies singly or in combination are to achieve the following 
objectives: 
1. Reverse the downward spiral of falling production, income and labour 
investments which characterise old Stage 3 blocks. 
2. Shift from an extension model of ‘teaching’ farmers about block 
management, to a system where the extension agents work in 
‘partnership’ with smallholders. 
3. Enhance smallholder motivation to produce cocoa by focusing on 
strategies to improve the quantity of easily accessible crop available for 
harvesting. 
 
Increase Smallholder Production by Promoting the Income Benefits of 
Extending the Period of Stage 2 Production. 
 
The quantity of accessible crop available for harvesting influences the type of 
production strategy employed by households.  High producing blocks in Stage 2 
(the farming phase), where pest and disease losses are relatively low, are 
harvested more frequently and have higher investments of labour in block 
maintenance (almost exclusively grass slashing) than blocks that have 
progressed to Stage 3.  The poorly maintained Stage 3 block becomes a ‘bush’ 
resource (the foraging phase), irregularly harvested when there is an immediate 
cash need.  
 
The aim in improving smallholder productivity is twofold.  First, there is a need 
to extend the Stage 2 farming phase through improved block management to 
prevent blocks entering prematurely into Stage 3, so that there is a longer period 
when the block is producing sufficient crop for dry bean production. An 




dry bean processing.  Second, it is necessary to promote replanting (where 
rehabilitation is not a viable option) to eliminate the unproductive Stage 3 (see 
below) (Figure 9.1).  Timely replanting would initiate a reversal of the 
downward spiral of declining labour inputs associated with rising pest and 
disease levels and falling yields, to an upward cycle of rising yields.  This 
would act as an inducement for smallholders to commit more labour to block 
maintenance and harvesting for dry bean production. 
 
 
Figure 9.1. The new two stage model of smallholder cocoa production 
(Stage 3 eliminated). 
 
To extend the productive Stage 2 phase, further promotion of the importance of 
regular pruning and shade control is required, as is training in the techniques of 
correct pruning and shade control1.  However, it is likely that even if extension 
services were readily available for training in pruning and shade control 
techniques, which they are not, the impact on productivity would not be great.  
Traditional extension activities that rely solely on ‘teaching’ smallholders block 
management techniques do not increase productivity significantly, as 
recognised by extension officers (see Chapter 7).  More innovative extension 





One extension strategy to improve productivity would be to raise awareness 
amongst smallholders of the income losses associated with the Three Stage 
model of production by making more visible to smallholders the relationships 
between different block management practices and future income flows.  For 
example, explaining the benefits of pruning on a late Stage 2 or Stage 3 block in 
terms of reduced pests and diseases, anticipated yield increases and future 
income flows may encourage growers to act on extension advice.  It should be 
emphasised how pruning a block of a particular age can generate additional 
income over the following 18 months, and extend the productive life of the 
cocoa block by a given number of years.  It would also be necessary for the 
extension message to explain how short-term income losses associated with 
heavy pruning are compensated by larger incomes over the longer term2.   
 
The distinction between short-term and long-term gains could be highlighted 
further among smallholders by using the Three Stage model of block 
development.  By quantifying the short and long-term income gains from 
pruning, smallholders would be more knowledgeable about the future returns 
on their labour, thereby increasing the effectiveness of extension messages.   
 
While linking labour inputs to future income flows in extension messages may 
go some way to encouraging smallholders to make larger investments of labour 
in block maintenance, it misses some of the fundamental constraints on labour 
supply that contribute to high rates of under-harvesting (see Chapters 5 and 6).  
The labour constraints operating within smallholder families must be taken into 
account in the development of extension strategies, and ways of overcoming 
such constraints must be identified and promoted.  For example, extension 
training could be accompanied by the promotion of the use of village work 
groups (e.g., youth, women, church and sports groups) to undertake pruning and 
shade control where labour shortages are a major constraint on production.  A 
more ambitious strategy to overcome labour constraints, which is being 
attempted in several locations with some success in the provinces of ENB and 
WNB, is the Nucleus Enterprise model of extension described below. 
 
Promote Rotational Replanting. 
Most growers do not think about replanting until the block is well into Stage 3 
and cocoa income is so low that they cannot afford to replant from recurrent 
income.  Thus, strategies that lessen the financial burden of replanting must be 
devised to overcome such reluctance.  The current extension recommendation 




strategy to make replanting affordable.  For example, replanting approximately 
60–100 trees at a time on a 1 ha block, or 10% of the block each year (G. 
McNally, NGIP-Newmark, pers. comm., January 2006), has several advantages 
over the conventional whole-block replanting method3.  First, under a rotational 
replanting program a significant proportion of the block remains in the 
productive Stage 2 phase (70% of the cocoa stand), which would be more than 
sufficient to finance replanting while providing the family with a relatively high 
level of income.  Under a 10% rotational strategy, 30% of the block would be in 
Stage 1 (10% less than 1 year old, 10% 1 year old, and 10% two years old) and 
70% would be in the productive Stage 2 phase.  G. McNally (NGIP-Newmark, 
pers. comm., January 2006) identifies the following advantages of staged or 
rotational replanting: 
∑ Affordability.  Replanting can be funded from recurrent income. 
∑ Consistent yields with a gradual improvement through time. 
∑ Opportunities for farmers to introduce new cultivars on a regular basis. 
∑ Opportunity to improve aspects of block management such as planting 
density and formation pruning. 
 
Design Replanting Packages that Suit the Management Practices and 
Needs of Smallholder Families. 
 
A suite of replanting packages should be designed to meet the needs of the main 
types of smallholder families.  The particular replanting package promoted to a 
farmer wishing to replant should be based on an understanding of the 
characteristics of his/her household, characteristics that could be easily 
ascertained with the use of a simple checklist at the seedling distribution point.  
Factors that should be taken into account when determining which replanting 
package to offer a grower include: availability of family labour (e.g. 
demographic characteristics of household); the personal priorities and 
objectives of the grower (e.g. need for income for paying school fees, investing 
in other businesses, etc); the economic situation of the household (access to 
land and other resources); their approach to cocoa farming (high levels of 
investment in farm inputs versus low levels of investment in farm inputs); and, 
the relative importance of cocoa production in household livelihood strategies.  
For instance, it would make little sense to supply a grower experiencing long-
term labour shortages with only hybrid clones that require high inputs of labour.  
It would be more appropriate to recommend to these growers that they purchase 
cocoa varieties tolerant of low labour inputs, and/or limit their seedling 
purchases to a quantity that can be effectively maintained given their household 





Ideally, replanting packages should include: 
∑ Promotion and advice on intercropping of replanted cocoa with food 
crops to encourage weed control. 
∑ Selection of the most appropriate cocoa variety given the circumstances 
of individual farmers and their families (e.g. available labour supply and 
financial needs). This may involve the development of a suitability 
ranking for smallholders of the different varieties of cocoa hybrids and 
clones.  
∑ Advice on the most appropriate type of cocoa shade given household 
labour supply and commitment to cocoa production. 
∑ Training and information on appropriate farm management techniques.  
Replanting with new cocoa hybrids and cocoa clones should be 
accompanied by training in the farm management techniques 
appropriate to the newly released cocoa varieties. 
 
Each point is addressed below. 
 
Intercropping of Cocoa 
The best managed cocoa stands are young cocoa blocks interplanted with food 
crops (Ghodake et al., 1995; see Chapter 7). Thus, intercropping newly 
replanted cocoa blocks with food crops and fruit trees would encourage growers 
to visit and weed their blocks more frequently.  Similarly, mature cocoa blocks 
shaded by fruit trees and bananas may encourage more regular visits to the 
block and increase incentives to undertake block maintenance (the block 
provides cash income and food).  In the 1970s, Bourke (1976) described how 
smallholders in some areas of the Gazelle modified their food crop systems by 
interplanting cocoa with bananas, Chinese taro and coconut.  As Bourke noted, 
such a system “evolved without the assistance of the Department of Agriculture 
and at times in direct opposition to its policy of separating food and cash 
cropping into different areas” (1976, p.93).   
 
The advantages of intercropping cocoa have been documented in other cocoa 
growing countries (e.g. Johns, 1999; Rice & Greenberg, 2000; Rosenberg 
& Marcotte, 2005). Advantages include more thorough weeding and reduced 
levels of pests and diseases. Pathology scientists at CCI are currently examining 
intercropping as a smallholder strategy for improved pest and disease control 
and CCI’s plant breeders are evaluating the advantages of planting cocoa clones 
in a ‘strip cultivation’ system (alternating strips of cocoa and food crops) 
(Efron, 2004; Konam & Namaliu, 2005). These cocoa farming systems have the 






Cocoa is a labour intensive crop and several recent releases of SG2 hybrids and 
hybrid clones require greater labour inputs (and different farm management 
practices) than earlier cocoa varieties such as Trinitario.  There is also evidence 
of early yield decline in SG2 hybrids and in some of the recently released 
hybrid clones (Figure 6.3).  Whilst recent releases of cocoa materials offer 
higher potential yields and improved disease resistance than earlier varieties, 
their high maintenance requirements, specialised pruning regimes and 
susceptibility to early yield decline, mean that potential yields may not be 
realised by smallholders experiencing labour shortages or without access to 
extension training and advice.   
 
Thus promotion of clones to smallholders must be balanced with the 
recognition that most hybrid clones require relatively high levels of labour 
inputs and complex management practices, without which they are prone to 
high mortality rates and damage from pests and diseases.  It is unrealistic to 
assume that hybrid clones will receive the necessary levels of management 
inputs when decades of research have consistently shown that most 
smallholders do not undertake basic block maintenance tasks (Chapters 3 and 
7).  Moreover, in remote areas where market access is poor or highly variable, 
there may be a case for encouraging smallholders to plant more robust planting 
material such as Trinitario which can tolerate prolonged periods of neglect and 
then be brought back into production when prices are high or when market 
access improves.  These issues require further investigation by CCI. 
 
CCI’s breeding section has already begun to develop informal guidelines 
regarding the suitability for smallholders of some types of hybrids and hybrid 
clones.  These informal guidelines are based on the potential vigour and 
required management practices of the different cocoa varieties.  However, 
further research is required using multi-location on-farm trials of new planting 
materials under a range of smallholder conditions and environments to develop 
guidelines that can be used when recommending planting/replanting packages 
to smallholders.  Such guidelines could incorporate a suitability ranking of the 
various hybrids and hybrid clones based on the key factors affecting 
smallholder production (e.g. labour availability and management practices) and 
the characteristics of the tree itself (e.g. sensitivity to labour inputs, 
management practices and tree size).  For example, there is evidence to suggest 
that some of the smaller hybrid clones may be more suitable for smallholders 




to maintain and harvest (D. Yinil, CCI, pers. comm., 2004).  Also, small clones 
may require less pruning labour than SG2 hybrids (G. McNally, NGIP-
Newmark, pers. comm., 20074).  The reluctance of growers to harvest pods on 
the upper branches of tall trees (which become a reservoir for Phytopthora – 
Chapter 7) may also be an advantage of the small hybrid clones over some 
larger cocoa varieties.   
 
Cocoa Shade 
Many smallholders in ENB have planted cocoa under coconuts, but 
increasingly Gliricidia has been promoted as a shade tree and is commonly 
used in areas around Vunalaiting where beetle damage to coconuts curtails the 
use of coconut shade.  The adoption of Gliricidia has led to widespread 
problems of overshading of cocoa trees and the creation of a moist micro-
environment in cocoa stands which is more conducive to pests and diseases.  
The selection and management of shade trees is crucial for managing diseases 
such as Phytophthora (McMahon & Purwantara, 2004).  Thus the promotion 
amongst smallholders of Gliricidia for cocoa shade should be reassessed.  This 
recommendation echoes that of Ghodake et al. (1995, p.125) made more than 
ten years ago: “urgent attention [be paid] to the evaluation and promotion of 
alternative shade tree species that require low management”.  Ghodake et al. 
(1995) suggest alternatives such as kalava, betel nut, marum and a range of fruit 
and nut trees which accords closely with the intercropping system advocated 
above.   
 
In areas where the Rhinoceros Beetle is not a significant coconut pest, coconuts 
should be promoted as a shade crop for cocoa, particularly for farmers 
practicing low labour input production.  Coconuts have long been recognised as 
the best shade crop for cocoa (consistent shade level, little maintenance 
required and a source of additional income — see Benton & Belfield, 1995), 
and the Kokonas Indastri Koporesen’s5 recent promotion amongst smallholders 
of the production of high value coconut products such as virgin coconut oil, has 
the potential to substantially increase and diversify the incomes of mixed cocoa-
coconut producing households.  Omuru (2005) estimates that a farmer selling 
copra and virgin coconut oil with cocoa can anticipate a 134.6% increase in 
gross income.  Moreover, it is known that cocoa under coconut palms in PNG 







CCI to Investigate New Extension Models that Involve Partnerships 
Between the Commercial Sector and Smallholder Communities. 
 
As highlighted at the beginning of this chapter, decades of conventional 
agricultural extension to ‘teach’ block management techniques have not 
resulted in significant productivity gains for smallholders.  As the Three Stage 
Model of smallholder production has revealed, in the absence of pruning and 
shade control, cocoa blocks at about 7 or 8 years of age inevitably slide into a 
downward spiral of increasing neglect, rising pest and disease levels and falling 
yields and income (the bush foraging strategy associated with Stage 3 
production — Figure 8.2).  Conventional extension strategies appear unable to 
reverse or even arrest this decline.  Therefore, it is recommended that CCI 
investigate the potential of promising new extension models involving the 
commercial sector working in partnership with smallholders to raise 
productivity and incomes.  Such partnership models would be less dependent on 
the erratic and uncertain government funding that has plagued extension efforts 
in recent years.  
 
One promising approach, which is gaining traction in PNG, is the Nucleus 
Enterprise (NE) model involving ‘partnerships’ between the commercial sector 
and smallholder producers.  Partnerships can range from the provision of farm 
management advice and seedling distribution by a village entrepreneur 
possessing the necessary business and agricultural skills, to joint venture 
companies between customary landowner groups and commercial companies.  
An aim of such partnerships is for extension and related services to become an 
integral part of the everyday production activities of smallholders as their 
‘Commercial Service Provider’ (CSP) becomes an active participant in the 
production process.  There are opportunities for existing government extension 
services (e.g., those provided by CCI and DPI) to be integrated into the NE 
model, particularly through supporting village entrepreneurs in their role as 
CSPs to their client communities (see below).   
 
A Template for a Nucleus Enterprise Model6 
Each NE, comprising 50-200 smallholder growers and their families, would be 
serviced by a CSP located centrally in each NE.  The most basic version of the 
model entails the CSP providing extension advice, processing facilities and a 
nursery for the supply of cocoa seedlings to growers.  Smallholders without 
their own processing facilities would supply wet bean to their CSP and receive 
a portion of the dry bean price.  The CSP would buy and process wet bean and 
purchase dry bean processed by growers, and transport and sell dry bean to 




bean prices (mainly because of reduced production costs — see below), and the 
operation and maintenance of the NE would be self-financing. 
 
This basic model of the NE can be scaled-up to provide growers with a range of 
additional productivity enhancing services, which may lead to other 
development opportunities for the farming community.  For example, additional 
CSP services might include training in fermenting and drying wet bean, credit 
for tools and processing facilities, and the implementation of quality control 
measures in the production process.  Importantly, the coordination of 
production provided through a NE arrangement offers scale economies that 
would reduce production costs for growers, especially in the areas of transport 
and processing.  A fortnightly pickup of crop (of both wet and dry bean) by the 
CSP, for example, offers considerable savings on transport compared with the 
typical situation where individual growers hire private vehicles to transport crop 
to town buyers7.  NGIP-Newmark has been operating a similar NE model with 
smallholders in the Bainings area of ENB with very successful results in raising 
smallholder incomes and productivity.   
 
Also, the structuring of work patterns resulting from fortnightly pickups of crop 
will encourage regular harvesting and block maintenance as a result of 
predictable market access at significantly reduced costs.  When growers know 
and are confident that their crop will be picked up on a certain day, they will 
count back the number of days to when harvesting should commence in order to 
leave sufficient time for processing wet bean.  Thus, the combination of 
guaranteed market access, credit facilities and the ready availability of 
extension advice and good planting material on-site will raise smallholder 
productivity and incomes and the quality of the final product through an 
extension of the farming phase associated with Stage 2 production.   
 
The NE concept has broad similarities to the nucleus estate-smallholder model 
adopted by the successful oil palm industry in PNG.  A key difference, 
however, is that oil palm companies operate their own plantations in addition to 
servicing the smallholder sector.  Under the NE model it is not necessary for the 
CSP to own or lease plantations, though this is not precluded by the model.  
CSP services may be limited to processing, marketing and extension provision, 
and purchasing wet bean (for CSP processing) and dry bean processed by 
smallholders.  The profitability of CSPs is partly dependent on smallholder 
productivity, which in turn is influenced by smallholder management practices, 




material and other inputs.  There is, therefore, a financial incentive for the CSPs 
to supply quality services in a timely manner to their smallholder clients. 
 
Organisation of NEs 
NEs could be established in a range of smallholder situations: in village 
communities; on plantations that have been returned to customary landowners; 
and in land settlement schemes based on cocoa production.  Many plantations 
returned to customary landowners are characterised by extremely low 
productivity and are carrying large debts, typically accumulated when the 
plantations were managed by management agencies.  If these plantations were 
surveyed, ‘blocked’ and allocated to individual families from the customary 
landowner group within a NE framework, then there would be considerable 
potential for productivity increases and the repayment of loans through a 
centralised payment system (see below).  With each family carrying a share of 
the total debt, it then becomes possible to clear debts and transfer leasehold title 
to individual families8.   
 
In village settings and land settlement schemes, cocoa farmers producing and 
selling wet bean would be organised into NEs by grouping council wards, local 
level government (LLG) areas, or land settlement subdivisions to a yet to be 
determined threshold for economic viability of an NE (50 to 200 families).  CCI 
could assist in this process and also liaise with ward councillors or LLG 
presidents for the allocation of a portion of land for the CSP to establish 
processing facilities and a nursery (perhaps under a lease arrangement to give 
the CSP some tenure security).   
 
The NE approach has advantages over existing extension models.  Two broad 
sets of advantages which are discussed further below include:  
∑ An integrated approach to CCI’s extension. 
∑ A centralised payment system that offers opportunities for mobilising 
labour (through innovative payment mechanisms), providing credit 
facilities (and a mechanism for debt recovery), and a means to finance 
community development initiatives. 
 
An Integrated Approach to Extension and Research  
With its considerable resources in extension, plant breeding, entomology and 
pathology, CCI is well-placed to support the extension role of CSPs, especially 
those CSPs lacking the resources of the larger companies.  It is also well-placed 
to conduct on-farm research trials.  Examples of some of these potential 





The establishment of CSP nurseries will improve smallholder access to the 
latest CCI technologies.  With appropriate training from CCI, CSP nurseries 
will be able to raise and sell healthy hybrid cocoa (and coconut) seedlings and 
cocoa clones to their NE smallholders.  The proximity of nurseries to growers’ 
blocks means farmers will save on transport costs.   
 
CCI extension services tailored to the needs of individual NEs. Village 
entrepreneurs who become CSPs can be trained and supported by CCI.  
Bringing CSPs together for training in formation pruning of the hybrid clones, 
for example, will improve the cost-effectiveness of CCI extension activities.  
CSPs with similar training needs can be brought together as a group in one CSP 
centre and given short courses to address those needs.  Field demonstration 
plots managed by each CSP with advice from CCI would enable smallholders 
to see how different management strategies for cocoa blocks affect yields and 
pest and disease rates. 
 
On-farm trials of new cocoa varieties would be relatively simple to organise 
and coordinate with the cooperation of CSPs located amongst grower 
communities.  Smallholders would also benefit by being directly involved in the 
Institute’s research programs (adaptive research), and their participation in on-
farm research should encourage rapid uptake of new technologies as they are 
released by CCI.  Smallholders participating in on-farm trials could be viewed 
as ‘early adopters’ who would serve as demonstration farmers to those who are 
typically more cautious in their uptake of new technologies.  Further, and very 
importantly, CCI researchers working on these trials would become more 
sensitive to and knowledgeable of the smallholder sector — something that is 
much more difficult to achieve when trials are limited to research stations as has 
largely been the case in the past.  On-farm trials will create a two-way flow of 
information between CCI and smallholders thereby enabling the needs of 
smallholders to be communicated more effectively to CCI senior management. 
 
The central processing facilities provided and operated by the CSP will 
improve the quality of processed cocoa which has been declining for reasons 
such as smoke tainting because of faulty kiln pipes and simple negligence.  The 
NE with a CCI-trained CSP using the latest processing technologies will lead to 
improvements in quality.  Quality assurance procedures implemented by the 
CSP in regard to dry bean processing by smallholders will also improve the 





Also, processing by the CSP will lead to higher conversion ratios of wet bean to 
dry bean.  Village producers achieve conversion rates of around 30–35%, but 
with appropriate processing facilities and procedures, CSPs would achieve 
conversion ratios in the order of 40–45%, thereby improving the value added 
component of production.  
 
Centralised Payment System to Mobilise Labour, Provide Credit Facilities and 
Finance Community Development Initiatives. 
The centralised payment system of a NE offers opportunities to introduce a 
range of other productivity enhancing initiatives and create development 
opportunities for smallholder communities.  In this section we outline three 
broad areas in which a central payment mechanism could be used to enhance 
productivity and development opportunities for the NE community of growers: 
1) strategies for the mobilisation of labour; 2) the provision of credit facilities 
(micro-credit); and 3) savings mechanisms for community development 
initiatives. 
 
1.  Mobilising Labour 
Research on oil palm and coffee smallholders in PNG (e.g., Overfield 1998; 
Koczberski et al., 2001; Curry & Koczberski, 2004; Koczberski, 2007) and 
smallholders in other countries (von Bulow & Sorensen, 1993; Dolan, 2001), 
reveals that uncertain, irregular or underpayment of family and hired labour 
creates disincentives to family members to contribute labour to cash crop 
production.  For example, in PNG, prior to the introduction of a separate 
payment system for female oil palm smallholders for the collection of ‘loose 
fruit’ (the ripe fruitlets dislodged from the oil palm bunch during harvesting), 
most women were reluctant to collect loose fruit because of the uncertain 
remuneration of their labour by their husbands.  They preferred to invest their 
labour in areas where they were confident of a return on their labour (e.g., food 
production for sale at local markets).  However, the advent of the ‘Mama Lus 
Frut’ scheme led to a large increase in the supply of female labour in oil palm 
production because they were guaranteed timely payment for their labour by the 
milling companies.  Similarly, the present study has found that one of the major 
constraints on the supply of labour in cocoa production is payment uncertainty, 
particularly of family members.   
 
The centralised payment system of the NE provides a mechanism for 
mobilising labour for block maintenance tasks such as pruning, shade 
management and the control of pests and diseases such as Black Pod and Cocoa 




church groups which are often available for hire for labour-intensive tasks such 
as the cutting and clearing of bush for new food gardens and cutting timber and 
thatching materials for housing.  If such groups, trained by their CSP, were 
contracted to undertake labour-intensive tasks such as pruning and shade 
control they could be paid by their CSP by a small deduction from growers’ 
cocoa payments.  Thus the reluctance of growers to pay cash for labour would 
be overcome and the yield response resulting from improved block maintenance 
would more than compensate for the deductions from growers’ incomes for the 
payment of hired labour.   
 
Lighter tasks such as pest and disease control measures, like the removal of 
Phytophthora affected cocoa pods, which are a source of disease inoculant 
while remaining on the tree, could be contracted to women’s groups or church 
groups.  The removal of diseased pods would significantly reduce infection 
rates amongst maturing pods thereby increasing the amount of healthy crop 
available for harvesting.   
 
The payment of labour for block maintenance tasks funded by small deductions 
from growers’ payments would be much more attractive to growers than paying 
cash for labour.  In an ideal situation, local youth groups skilled in pruning and 
shade control, and with access to appropriate tools, would perform these 
essential block maintenance tasks.  Such a maintenance programme would 
extend Stage 2 production (the farming phase).  This combined with the 
rotational replanting programme discussed above would mean that most blocks 
would remain in the high production Stage 2 farming phase indefinitely.  The 
combination of higher yields and improved accessibility would be a stimulus 
for dry bean processing and the deployment of larger harvesting groups.   
 
The centralised payment system can be used in other ways to maintain 
production.  For example, when a grower is ill or moves away for an extended 
period (e.g. working in town) they can arrange with the CSP to pay a labourer 
to work on the block to ensure production and maintenance are not neglected.  
Payment to the labourer would be made by deductions from the grower’s 
payments, while the cocoa grower would still receive an income during the time 
when they are unable to work on the block.  In effect, the CSP guarantees 
payment of the labourer for work done thereby ensuring the latter’s ongoing 






The mobilisation of labour for block maintenance tasks should be timed so as 
not to coincide with the biannual cocoa flushes in order to maximise the supply 
of harvesting labour during peak cropping periods.  Labour-intensive block 
maintenance tasks such as pruning and shade control should be timed, as far as 
possible, to coincide with periods of high cash demands.  For example, the 
motivation of youth groups to perform contract pruning and shade control 
would be greater when school fees are due.  These sorts of considerations 
should be taken into account by CSPs designing block maintenance 
programmes.   
 
2.  Provision of Credit Facilities  
The centralised payment system would enable larger CSPs, like private 
companies, to provide credit facilities to individual growers for small purchases 
such as seedlings, tools and other farm inputs.  These loans could be recouped 
from growers through deductions from their cocoa payments.  For assets 
requiring larger loans such as for fermentaries and dryers, group loans to 
members of an extended family group who intend sharing the processing 
facilities, might be preferable to individual loans.  Loan repayments are 
dependent on a level of trust and genuine partnership developing between the 
CSP and its NE clients.  In areas where there are multiple buyers of crop (e.g. 
near urban centres), these sorts of credit facilities would be more difficult to 
establish than in isolated regions where there may be only a single buyer 
operating.   
 
3.  Savings Mechanism for Community Development Initiatives. 
The centralised payment system through the CSP could also provide a savings 
mechanism with the potential to generate considerable social benefits for 
members of the NE.  Benefits can be at three levels: the individual, the group 
(e.g. family, sports or church) and the community.  For the individual grower, 
an agreed savings rate based on production (e.g. 10 t/kg of wet bean) could be 
deducted from CSP payments to growers and locked away in special purpose 
savings accounts thereby enabling smallholder cocoa income to be transformed 
into material improvements in the quality of life for growers.  Such a savings 
mechanism would provide a powerful incentive for growers to raise 
productivity.  Rather than most income being expended on immediate 
consumption or dissipated through social and kinship networks because of the 
demands of the traditional exchange economy as at present, a proportion of 
smallholder income would be isolated from such demands and therefore be 




housing).  A savings mechanism would create a strong and direct relationship 
between cocoa productivity and material improvements in living standards thus 
increasing growers’ motivation to invest labour in their blocks.   
 
The same savings mechanism could also be used to fund the activities of 
community groups where savings contributions up to a set amount are deducted 
from each group member’s payments and paid into a group account.  Soccer 
teams and women’s groups, for example, could use the mechanism to raise 
funds whether as voluntary donations to the fund through deductions or by 
hiring out the group’s labour for block maintenance tasks.   
 
Other possibilities include implementing, with the broad consent of the NE 
community, a ‘community development’ levy on production.  Such a levy could 
fund projects and services such as upgrading of aid posts, water supply, feeder 
roads, etc., with project and service priorities determined by the community.  
Moreover, if a ‘kina for kina’ arrangement were negotiated with the LLG to 
fund projects and services that the community requires, this would further 
increase the social benefits of the community development fund.  More 
importantly, such initiatives involving partnerships between LLGs and NE 
communities would create amongst the communities a sense of ownership and 
responsibility for projects.   
 
In summary, the NE provides a platform for an extension of the Stage 2 farming 
strategy and the replacement of the unproductive Stage 3 foraging strategy with 
Stage 1 replant (Figure 9.1).  The benefits for growers, their families and their 
communities include: 
∑ Enhanced market access. 
∑ Lower costs of production, particularly for transport and processing. 
∑ Improved quality of product. 
∑ Higher productivity. 
∑ Improved and more carefully targeted extension services and training. 
∑ Access to quality planting material. 
∑ Improved access to credit. 
∑ Increase in household incomes. 
∑ More employment and business opportunities for smallholders. 
∑ Mechanism for financing community development activities. 






Thus, the NE model has considerable potential to raise smallholder productivity 
by altering the way extension services are delivered to growers.  Further, as has 
already been demonstrated by the oil palm industry, the centralised payment 
system made possible through the coordinated production of a NE also provides 
a mechanism for transforming cocoa income into improvements in the 
standards of living of growers and their communities, thereby creating 
additional incentives for growers to raise productivity and incomes.  Perhaps 
more importantly, from the perspective of growers and their communities, the 
centralised payment mechanism offers a way to generate rural employment 
opportunities for youth and women by mobilising labour for block 
maintenance.  It also opens up a range of other development opportunities for 
the community through the provision of savings mechanisms and development 
levies. 
 
The broad nature of the strategies described in this chapter to improve 
smallholder production and incomes point to the complex and wide ranging 
constraints on smallholder productivity.  Key aspects to improving smallholder 
production are to reverse the premature transition of cocoa blocks into the 
unproductive Stage 3 foraging phase and to enhance smallholder motivation to 
invest labour in cocoa production through improving market access and the 
productivity of their cocoa holdings.  The strategies discussed above to address 
these issues go beyond simply increasing the production and incomes of 
smallholder households but also aim to reinvigorate the cocoa industry through 
encouraging the commercial sector to take more responsibility for the delivery 
of extension and other services to smallholders.  This will also generate wider 
social benefits for the community and rural employment opportunities for youth 
and women.  This broader approach is needed if the cocoa smallholder sector is 







1. The oil palm industry expanded rapidly in the last decade and became the 
main export crop in 2001, followed in second place by coffee. 
 
2. However, changes in exchange rate policy prompted by the IMF 
stabilisation programme in 1994 led to the devaluation of the local currency.  
Thus domestic commodity prices exceeded the minimum guaranteed price 
and hence bounty (deficiency) payments ceased in 1994. 
Chapter Two 
 
1. In late 2003 CCEA was amalgamated with CCRI to form CCI.  
 




1. For a detailed discussion on changes to land use and land tenure on the 
Gazelle Peninsula, see Salisbury (1970) and Lowe (2006). 
Chapter Four 
 
1. Only those members of the family residing with a household at the time of 
the survey were recorded as belonging to the household.  Absentees of more 
than seven nights away or married children living independently were 
excluded.  Median household size of 8 on the Gazelle Peninsula was 
reported by Ghodake et al. (1995).  Omuru et al. (2001) recorded median 
household size of 7 in their ENB study.  According to 2000 census data, 
average household size for ENB is 5.6. 
 
2. The relatively high proportion of children attending school is an indication 
of the importance families place on education.  This is despite increases in 
school fees over the last five years which have undoubtedly placed a 
substantial financial burden on most families.  For this population, 
schooling is a central part of young children’s lives, and school activities 




3. Sometimes individuals came together in a group to contribute funds to 
repurchase plantations with the intention of either managing the plantation 
as a group concern or subdividing it into smallholder blocks.  If the latter 
option was followed, the size of an individual’s block was determined by 
the proportion of the total payment made by that particular individual (M. 
Tabar, CCI, pers. comm., 2005). 
   
4. There have been cases where customary landowners claimed that their land 
was forcefully alienated by authorities or purchased by dubious means by 
traders.  Some of these customary landowners have repossessed their land 
outside the legal process of purchasing the land under the government’s 
land reacquisition and distribution scheme (W. Reven, Lands Office, 
Kokopo, pers. comm., 2005). 
 
5. If payment is made in cash, the clan leader may trade the cash for shell 
money for the long-term benefit of the clan.  A common practice to obtain 
shell money is to purchase pigs (or piglets to be raised) which are later 
slaughtered and distributed to clan members for shell valuables. 
 
6. Similar disputes over inheritance of leasehold blocks occur on the Hoskins 
and Bialla oil palm land settlement schemes in WNB Province (Koczberski 




1. Estimates of annual household income for dry bean sellers were obtained by 
averaging mean income earned per dry bean harvest sale for income data for 
smallholders in the Kokopo-Vunamami LLG and Livuan-Reimbar LLG 
areas from October to December 2003, from May to October, 2004, and 
from December 2004 to January 2005.  The mean income earned per dry 
bean harvest sale (taken from socio-economic survey and weekly survey 
results) was then multiplied by five.  The latter figure is the estimated 
average number of dry bean sales per year made by ENB smallholders 
reported by Omuru et al. 2001.  It should also be noted that dry bean sellers 
occasionally sell some wet bean when they need cash for immediate 
consumption.  These wet bean sales have not been included in the dry bean 
annual income total.  Annual income from wet bean sales was calculated by 
multiplying the average mean income earned per wet bean harvest sale of 
K17 by 24 weeks, which is the estimated number of times wet bean is sold 




period ranged from K0.80 to K1.20/kg for wet bean, and K250 to K285 for 
a 63.5 kg bag of dry bean. 
 
2. The large percentage of time spent ‘resting at house’ was influenced by 
frequent rain events during the survey period.  It also incorporates leisure 
time and socialising.  Similarly, illness frequency was higher during wet 
periods.  
 
3. The constraints on female labour in smallholder oil palm production in PNG 
were overcome with the introduction of the Lus Frut Mama Scheme, which 
pays women separately from their husbands for their work carried out on 
family oil palm plots (see Koczberski, 2007).   
 
4. The term ‘market related activities’ combines the columns ‘garden 




1. While the very large disparity in incomes between wet and dry bean sellers 
reflects the economic advantages of owning a fermentary, it is likely that the 
income disparity is not quite as large as first appears.  Many dry bean sellers 
purchase wet bean so their net incomes are reduced and many growers who 
sell wet bean to exporters in town would also sell to village processors so 
their income is under-estimated. 
 
2. To be eligible for a cocoa fermentary license from the Cocoa Board, an 
individual must have at least 2 ha of cocoa.  It is also a condition of the 
license that production does not fall below 2 tonnes per year (32 bags of 
export quality cocoa per annum). 
 
3. It is now very difficult to establish coconuts in East New Britain Province 
because of these pests. 
 
4. When questioned about the theft of cocoa pods, extension officers 
commented that young men’s theft of cocoa pods was partly driven by their 







5. G.McNally (NGIP-Newmark, pers. comms., May, 2007) claims that 
changes in yield make a large impact on smallholder investment decisions, 
far more so than changes in price.   
 
6. Curry and Koczberski carried out extensive garden surveys in 1988-89 in 




1. Data are drawn from the repeat weekly surveys of households, the baseline 
socio-economic survey and the cocoa farm management assessments (see 
Chapter 2 for details). 
 
2. Growers report that there can be very high mortality rates amongst the new 
hybrid clones when they are young if weeds and grasses are not kept under 
control.  They attribute the higher mortality rate of clones to their greater 
sensitivity to over-shading and greater vulnerability to ringbarking by 
Longicorn larvae.  Growers claim that the bark of hybrid clones is thinner 
and softer than the bark of older cocoa varieties. 
 
3. VSD is noticeable because the leaves on infected branches dry out and turn 
brown.   
 
4. Whilst the pod counts provide a useful indication of pod disease and levels 
of under-harvesting, they are approximate measures only and care must be 
taken in their interpretation for two reasons.  First, dry pods can be 
distinguished from Phytophthora infected pods (Black Pod) by slight colour 
differences and the harder husks of dry pods, but it is more difficult to 
distinguish between them when Phytophthora infected pods are old or 
located on the upper branches of cocoa trees.  Second, the ratio of diseased 
or dry pods to total pods per tree decreases as the period lengthens between 
a harvest round and the pod count following that harvest round.  For dry 
pods, this relationship holds for up to two to three weeks, after which 
unharvested mature pods turn into dry pods.  Thus, a cocoa tree harvested 
immediately before a count of diseased or dry pods will have fewer mature 







5. To determine if an edge-effect were present, the first four cocoa trees into 
the block from the roadside edge (or house if located on the block) were 
analysed.  This extends for a distance of approximately 30 to 50 m.  The 
analysis was restricted to the first four cocoa trees because of the great 
variation in cocoa block shapes and sizes.  
  
6. It should be pointed out that the number of extension visits is probably 
inflated because a CCI extension officer had a cocoa block at Tabaule.  He 
visited his block on weekends and was sometimes called upon to give 
advice to neighbouring growers.  A second extension officer had relatives 
living in one of the survey villages and was a regular visitor to his village 
on weekends.  It is likely that he provided some extension advice to his 
relatives and neighbours. 
 
7. Formation pruning is required to ensure up-right growth and sufficient 
branching. 
 
8. In a workshop with extension officers in 2004 (see Chapter 2), one criterion 
which extension officers used to distinguish high producers from low 






1. Some smallholders may also pool their wet bean with harvests from 
extended family members’ plots to make up sufficient quantities for dry 
bean processing.  
 
2. The harvest round may allow for harvesting of the whole block or a portion 
thereof.   
 
3. Ghodake et al. (1995) noted this expansion of cocoa was motivated by the 
desire of farmers to secure ownership of land (see Chapter 4 for further 
discussion).   
 
4. Block surveys conducted at Makurapau and Karavi villages in Kokopo 








1. This is especially the case for smallholders planting the new hybrid clones. 
 
2. Some smallholders are averse to pruning because of the perceived short-
term loss of income from the removal of branches. 
 
3. In Papua New Guinea many cocoa plantations aim to replant 10% of their 
trees each year.   
 
4. G. McNally estimates, based on cocoa plantation conditions, SG2 hybrids 
require 15 man days of labour per hectare for pruning each year.  Some of 
the new hybrid clones require only 8 man days per year.   
 
5. Kokonas Indastri Koporesen is the government’s policy and regulation 
authority for coconut products in PNG. 
 
6. The section draws on Duigu & Omuru (2003).  It has also greatly benefited 
from discussions with J. Duigu (J. Duigu and Associates) and G. McNally 
(NGIP-Newmark) who have been developing new extension models based 
on commercial sector partnerships with smallholders. 
 
7. Moreover, the provision of transport for carting firewood to growers’ 
processors in the intervening weeks between harvest pickups would 
encourage more farmers to process wet bean and thus benefit from value 
adding.  It would also encourage regular harvesting. 
 
8. The RDB in association with the ENB provincial authorities, the provincial 
Lands Department and CCI has recently commenced a pilot project of such 
a strategy at Bailu Plantation near Kokopo.  The plantation, which has a 
heavy debt burden, was surveyed in 2007 and subdivided amongst 160 
families, each of which is responsible for its share of the debt (Trudi Egi, 
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